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. XL 1259 to 1270 
(4) wren. Papers V o l I & I I Bedford Corres. I l l 
Waljiole's Geo. I l l , Walpole's l e t t e r s Y 
Grafton Memoirs, Lonsdale's papers H i s t . 
K.S.S.~ftept. X I I I P t . V I I . 
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(6) Papers i n Eng. H i s t . Rev. XXII,75* 
(7) Of. Contemporary Ideas - "e views i n Gentlaman's 
Magazine Oct. and iiOY, 1761. a l s o E n t i o k vol.V, 
P i t t ' s Spanish P o l i c y i n 1761. 
"X 
The f a l l of the great ministry of the Elder P i t t i s 
e a s i l y the prime event i n the f i r s t year of tne reign of 
George I I I * From the standpoint of ultimate consequences 
i t i s likewise one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t doourenoes of the 
s i x t y years of that reign. I t s r e s u l t s - d i r e c t or eventual-
are r e a d i l y recalled. It'meant the transference of*the French 
war - whioh P i t t l o g i c a l l y had made h i s own, and of the i n -
evitable Spanish war - whioh was about to be declared against 
him - into hands, new to administration, l e s s able to d i r e c t . 
I t brought a peace incommensurate with B r i t i s h conquests, 
and yet, not a l a s t i n g peace. I t opened the way for the 
early break-up of the Whig system, and the reassertion of 
half-forgot Tory ideas of the royal prerogative, thus i n -
v o l v i n g new party alignments, further corruption,and a back-
sat to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development. For England i t deferred 
reform. For America, i t allowed the substitution of b l i n d 
d r i f t i n g , and obstinate f o l l y f o r the r a t i o n a l c o l o n i a l p o l -
i c y - the imperial plan - he had conceived. 
There ex i s t s very general agreement as to the r e s u l t s 
of P i t t ' s resignation; there are divergent opinions as to 
the causes and the ethics of h i s action. Whether P i t t should 
- or could - have retained the seals a f t e r the events oulmi-
1 EnfcieKV pg. 20B - Gent. ?>g. H O Y 1761 Vol.jqeCL I * , 514' 
2) Revue Historique Vol94 P-l f f . esp. 8, * 
3) Example Horace Walpole, 
4} Bedford eto. Cf. C o r . ' I l l 14 •& 42, EnticKT-199. 
(5 Cf. Walpole's Letters kV. p. 91, 144. (6) FuentesVto Wall. P i t t Cor. I I p 1ÔO 
rating i n the Cabinet Session of 2 Oot. duubtless w i l l remain' 
a mooted point, for i t i s quite largely a matter of the per-
sonal equation. I t i s interesting i n this connection, however, 
to note that there were those of his contemporaries who up-
held h i s action on constitutional grounds such as are of com-
paratively recent acceptation. Passing nottf, therefore, the 
question of the proper bestowal of blame or commendation upon 
P i t t , the causes of his resignation may be considered. 
Various explanations - or conjectures - have been made 
as to the fundamental reasons for the retirement of F i t t at 
t h i s time. The FrenoA and Spanish /flifcistries - Choiseul i n 
part i c u l a r 1 surmised that important among the causes was 
B r i t i s h opposition to tne war showing i t s e l f i n internal 
disaffection, especially opposition to mi l i t a r y service and 
taxes, or i n the d i f f i c u l t y of securing necessary parliamen-
tary grants, and the sale of B r i t i s h stock. Desire for peace, 
assuredly there was i n England, but no necessity nor demand 
for peace. There were many who deprecated the existence of 
continued war, who f e l t that war was e v i l . There were some 
statesmen, too - who shivered at the wind of B r i t i s h renown, 
who were frightened at the growth of the i r conquests. But 
there were many others who enjoyed the shouting and the bon-
f i r e s of victory celebrations, and some besides who throve 
f i n a n c i a l l y i n war time. The suspicion that a popular oppo-
s i t i o n to the war was raising i t s e l f i s indeed essentially 
groundless. I t doubtless was based c h i e f l y upon an ^exaggerat-
(1) Gent. Mag. 31: 137-8 Annmal Register 1761. Galen. Home 
Office Papers (1760-65) 1761. PasBim. 
(2) Ibid. i . t , - ^ ^ c ^ , 
(30) Ibid. ^ " , ~ J v 
14) Letters of Newcastle to Hardwioke. 
(5) EntiokV 88, 267jGent,Kag.Vol.31 p ol7, 
(6) Compare Stock quotations i n Gent.Tag. 1759,1760,1761,1762. 
(7) Walpole Geo. I I I , . Vol I: 9 ( Ch. I à II) Mitohell Ms*, quoted 
in P i t t Cor. I I : 83, 
(8.) Cf. Gent. Mag. l i s t s . 1760. & 1761"B.M. add. M.S.S. 
32915 f 332. J 
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ed notion of the importance of the Yorkshire i r f i l i t i a r i o t s . 
In r e a l i t y these matters were isolated and petty. The only 
one of any importance, that at Hexham, was quelled i n a few 
hours, without requiring unusual measures, and the subsequent 
t r i a l of the participants attracted no interest. While to 
offset t h i s , other countries raised their new levies with 
a l a o r i t y and were ready i n camp before the specified times. 
The number of criminals receiving commutation of sentences 
on condition of m i l i t a r y service was below the average, and 
such enlistments were only i n the marines or i n Jamaican foot 
regiments. The Duke of Newcastle, 6hanoellor-of the-Exchequer, 
indeed, as his use was, complained of raising the necessarily 
increasing war expenditures^ but he re a l l v admitted that i t 
could be done without serious d i f f i c u l t y - Horeever, on the 
other hand,contemporary accounts agree that at no time had 
the fuiids been so easily raised. In parlaient the grants were 
made with remarkable unanimity. Indeed^of the amount author-
ized f o r 1761, a considerable sum had not been used when the 
new parli^ent met i n November. Loans issued met Abids. London-
Oo) 
ere were eager. The stook market was unusually strong during 
most of 1961. 
Again,the supposition has been advanced that the ad-
mission of Tories into the household of the offices of govern-
ment i s evidence of a r i s i n g faction at court opposing P i t t 
and his measures. In fact the number of Tories thus favored 
or Indeed coming to court, i s remarkably small, especially 
i n view of the party bias of the King and the favorite ;Bute. 
(1) Walpole's Letters Vîno. 72** 
(2) 'Ibid. 
(3) M i t c h e l l : i n P i t t . Cor. 11:82-3 nota, 
{4) Walpole Letters V:152 
(5) B.M, aià^M^. 32989 f, 19* 
(6) Rigby-HtfpS^lS Aug."They expect Opposition i n Parliament", 
, I Bedford Cor» I I I : 40, 
(T) Walpole Letters Val V no.736. Compare Analytle liât 
i n Gent, Mag. 1761 also Cf. l i s t s of rr.eribere In ?ai 
Hi si* • • • %f'f «, % 
f Ô) Gent, Mag, Vol,31 : 460-66 . 
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Newcastle along - and he not without s i m i l a r s i n - seems to 
have objected, being jealous a t A l o s s of the nomination p r i -
vilege. As usual he raised a teapot-tempest to the deleota-
t i o n of the wit*. P i t t did not complain, and with reason, 
for the Tories had node been among h i s stanchest supporters 
i n the l a t e parliament. In view of such facts the idea of 
a torj opposition at this time i s c l e a r l y baseless. 
P i t t himself i n h i s farewell speech i n the Cabinet 
(2 Oct.) declares that he wax no longer has enough support i n 
council or parliament to act. Just what he meant to imply 
. . . . . . . . . . . • • 
by"support" and how largely^ i n view of t h i s lack of support, 
h i s decision was influenced by personal f e e l i n g s , how l a r g e l y 
due to necessities of the situation, we do not know. I t i s true 
that on the p o l i c y i n point he had no supportar i n the council 
save Lord Temple. Also he was aware of the King's a t t i t u d e . 
The reference to Parliament may imply that he was apprehensive 
of opposition from the newly elected Gommons, i n which body 
^ e* 
there would be^unpraoedent^number of new men̂  Usually, how-
ever, P i t t was frankly independent of a parliamentary party. 
He counted c h i e f l y on the effeot of popular pressure, because 
of h i s popularity i n the C i t y and throughout the country. 
He oontroled no patronage. His personal following was small. 
However the voting strength of the other Whig factions which 
supported the c o a l i t i o n s of Whigit leaders was doubtless es-
s e n t i a l to him, and he may have referred to the coming effects 
of the defection of h i s colleagues. Resignation on the 
(1) Calendar State Papers - P a r i . H i s t , etc - Annual Register. 
(8) Lecky'j, Stanhope, et*. 
(3) Cf. 'Winstanley Eng. H i s t leview Vol.17 p.C7& 
(4) The question might he sett l e d upon a thorough s i f t i n g 
of a l l MS. . and printed souroes, e s p e c i a l l y the Bute 
papers and whatever may show the King's personal p a r t 
and views. The a r t i c l e by D.A. Winstanley , Eng. F i s t . 
Rev. Vol 17 i s based almost wholly ' upon lie woes t i e and 
HardwickenMSS., whioh should have seen balanced with published "papers". I t s bias i s evident* A l s o i n u t l g g 
h i s MBS, he makes errors, -̂v*. -i^v-O* Q J M J ^ — < \ Q̂h-*— 
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grounda assigned was so unprecedented - was considered by 
many so absurd - i n the 18th. century that i t i s scarcely to 
be assumed that P i t t resigned from constitutional scruples, 
inoident to the situation i n which he found himself. 
Other theories might be named but are inconsequential. 
However, a well-beaten track has, customarily, been followed 
i n treating t h i s subject. In March 1761 France made formal 
overtures f o r peace. In March Lord Bute regularly entered the 
inner Cabinet, as Secretary of State for the Northern Province. 
In September oocurjpd the rupture of the negotiations, and the 
same month the i s o l a t i o n of P i t t i n the Cabinet, with the 
opposition gathered seemingly around Bute. Evidently because 
of these striking* coincidences i t has been assumed that two 
t r a i n s of circumstances were at work during this time, either 
or both of which tending d i r e c t l y toward the overthrow of 
P i t t s dominance. Thus events of the year are considered from 
two aspects, the one domestlo - p o l i t i c a l , partisan -, the 
other foreign - diplomatic. 
The p o l i t i c a l hypothesis, that the displacement of 
P i t t merely announced the f i r s t victory of a defi n i t e govera-
mental program) or at least that i * was due to a regular cabal 
actuated by jealousies or spite,- finds i n the analysis of 
accessible souroe* quite inadequate support, granted the Toryism 
of the King and his Leicester House advisors, yet what evidence, 
unoolored by personal bias, not transparently based upon an 
interpretation derived from subsequent events^may be adduced 
(1) Cf. WalpolésGeo. I l l Vol,I Chaps.I £ II-
(2$ Rockingham MemoirsI p 6. f f a r t i o l s ^ r a n s a o t i o a a «V 
Royal Hist. So. 1908 C**»*a~-*»V*** 
(3) Cf. his Diary especially pags 432. ^ 
(4) Pïtt Cor. I I p 89-101 passim, 
(5) Bedford Çor. I I 423, 
(6) Cf, Eng. Hist v Rev. supra. (7) Cf. events of 1761-
(8) Walpole Geo,III Vol.1 p,8; 
Rockingham Mem. I :8ff;B..M. add.IBS. 32917 f, 171. 
{9) Rockingham Mem. I • 
(u) Walpole;Geo I I I , 
(id) Walpole : Letter s V : l to 10,<*l£4 
Cf. Walpole'âGeo. I l l Vol.1 Chaps.l to 3. 
for the assumption, that Geo I I I , with or without Bute, 
inaugurated from his accession a consistent policy of 
crushing the Whigs, and reviving the royal prerogative, 
at the ea r l i e s t possible date? The Hardwicke Memorial us-
ua l l y quoted i s undeniably biased; export; facta, and often 
erroneous. Newcastle's whining jealousies and jerkiads, 
Bubb Dodington's wishes and advice, or the Spanish guesses 
of Fnentes, are scarcely proofs s u f f i c i e n t for conviction 
in the absence of direct or probable evidence from the side 
of Bute or P i t t - or the King. I t i s largely evidence of 
t h i s dubious sort which hasbeen offered i n support of the 
theory that a four aot plot was enacted to forOe P i t t out. 
We might grant the four s h i f t s i n the royal attitude toward 
Newcastle and P i t t -, and s t i l l with at least as excellent 
reason ascribe i t a l l to the v a c i l l a t i o n natural to the lack 
of polioy, as to the subtlety of a deep purpose. 
There seems to no f a i r reason to assume that the x 
A 
King was insincere in pressing his grandfather's ministers 
to remain i n o f f i c e . Why suspect i n his f i r s t audiences with 
these leaders, an intention to slight P i t t and to sow d i s -
oension i n the council? Why may not Walpole's contemporary 
impression be truer, than the estimate colored by the Know-
ledge of other years? For i t i s a patent fact that King 
and favorite came to power untrained i n handling men, inex-
perienced i n statescraft. They needed to grope their way, 
to use the aid of men already versed i n the situation. And 
( l ) Walpole'.letters V p. 3. 
(S) Cf. above page 8, 
(3) Dodington pages 415-35» 
(4) Example Granville Kinietry 1713 WMÈmxM 
(5) ̂ -Walpole Geo. I l l Vol 1 p 8 ; W ^ ^ ^ r . (6) i s fcroom of the Stole , 
(7) WalpolelLetters V p. 36. 
( 
(8) Frankly there are various questions regarding Bute 
the solution of whioh might a f f e c t these conolusions 
e.g. Was he always quite s i no ere? What was the extent 
o of his influence, with the king? Can we i n f e r Geo I I I 
ideas at t h i s period Crom Bute's a t t i t u d e Did Kaloorr.fct 
r e a l l y possess Bute's confidence,-either to know h i s 
purposes, or to influence h i s at t i t u d e ? In f a c t strangely 
the Earl of Bute has been l e f t sons what af a mjaterr to ua. 
It i s much to be wished that a systematic p u b l i c a t i o n of 
his papers might be made, and that a thorough study o f 
his l i f e should be given us. 
the unaided progress of man or master was not s t a r t l i n g l y 
CO 
rapid. I t was anticipated with reason that a revolution 
would be made at once i n the household. The changes were 
few, and .Newcastle's outcry over Tories was scarcely the 
gossip of an hour. Subsequent oJianges were made, but they 
likewise were not many. In such cases* indeed, Bute took 
his own counsel chiefly, and Hewoastle did not control the 
patrongge now, but nothing indicates that the King at a l l 
contemplated at this time a Whig"proscription. 
That on other grounds - personal d i s l i k e or lack of 
confidence for example-the king i n i t i a t e d , or from the start 
fostered an intrigue against P i t t iB most dubious: that 
Bute was tne intriguer seems quite as improbable. #eorge 
III l a t e r showed himself an adept i n double-dealings with 
his ministers, i n setting men at variance with their asso-
ciates. In such oases however, the facts, motives and 
C5> 
course of the intrigues are clear. In th i s case facts, 
motive,and experience are wanting. Aa to Bute, there i s 
no motive, his former coolness with P i t t was forgotten. 
Mo) 
there was no jealousyjfor his own position was more secure, 
and i t was unattended with the anaious responsibility of 
a chief minister. 3?rue, the secret manoeuvres attending 
Bute's entrance into office i n March lend color to the 
(%) 
charge against him. But i f from distrust of the aggres-
siveness - or tne sincerity-of the directing minister, i t 
was intended that as coordinate i n the secretariat he mhould 
(1) Eng. His t . Bey. Vol 17. p. 678, 
(2) Weston papers in Hist. I'MS. Com. Repts X p. 820, 
(3) Cf. Jenkinson's Letters in Granville Papers vol.11. 
(40> Bedford Cor. pgs. 14 & 29 tO 34,*Titt Cor. vol, II. p.136. 
(5) Granville Papers Vol. I, —^- . wc t -r 
(6) Cf. letters of Puentes i n P i t t Cor. Vol.'II ( ^..o^w-'S^v^î, (7) B.M. add, MSSv.32928 - f -269, also of. Bute to iieloomoe in 
Adolphus I 572 Ap. 
(8) Cf. Spanish Declaration o_f War,Pari. Hist.XV. 
be a f o i l for P i t t and insure the consummation of the pro-
posed peaoe, thon Lord Bute scarcely played h i s role. He 
cert a i n l y avoided crossing P i t t ' s f o i b l e s , or so f a r as we 
know, of causing f r i c t i o n i n t h e i r mutual administrative 
intercourse. He Uniformly acquiesced i n P i t t ' s conduct of iKe. 
diplomatic situation i n the Spring and Summer of 1761. 
His idea as""the scope or B r i t i s h demands from France agreed 
if . 
with that of P i t t , and he refused to consider Bedford*s 
. * 
urgent advioe"of generous terms". The courtier indfeed pro-
bably deprecated, on behalf of the King^the brusqueness of 
thev"oommoner, he apparently treated Bussy and Fuentes p o l i t e -
(3> 
l y , but his a t t i t u i a was likewise firm, u n t i l the close of 
August. In short at the beginning of the year,by uniform 
report, the union between Bute and P i t t was complete, as 
Cabinet Colleagues they worked i n unison, wh&Ve i n September 
Bute joined the other faction i n xna opposition. He did so 
with frank reluctance, and continued with them because the 
si t u a t i o n made the outcome inevitable, as he believed. 
Indeed after P i t t ' s resignation some men, both i n England adn 
and on the continent, suspeoted that P i t t worked through 
Bute, while i t i s well known that subsequently Bute sought 
on several occasions the return of P i t t to power. 
While the general agreement of Bute and P i t t may be 
conceded, unquestionably there was f r i c t i o n between P i t t and 
others of h i s colleagues. They complained of h i s manner, 
although h i s discourtesy probably has been overemphasized 
Indeed, the language of Temple was more offensive, and P i t t 
(1) .B..M. aôjLMSS, 35870 f, 301. & 32928 f,303. 
(2) Fuentas's to Wall, 1 ^ . « « a k * ^ 
(3) E n t i c k V,p,182 f f, - Gent. Mag 1761 -
Cf. Bussy & Choiseul Cor, 
(4) Eng. -HistvBaT îStiât Vol 17 p. 678, 
(5) Bedford Cor, I I I : 22 f£ 
-(6) G r a n v i l l e Papers I : ,382. 
(Si i b i d * ^ P i t t Cor. passim* 
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apparently had to bear the offenses of both. Jealousy of 
P i t t there was perhaps espeoially: a general dis s a t i s f a c t i o n 
with t h e i r position i n the Cabinet, finding rent i n mutter-
ing against h i s p o l i c i e s , diplomatic meddling, and a growing 
revolt against his dominance. They had intercourse with 
Bussy and he, i n pursuance of ht s "real mission of r a i s i n g 
a l l manner of opposition to the v i r t u a l premier, had f i l l e d 
t h e i r not unwilling ears with Insidious hints, and had height-
ened t h e i r discontent. Thus the faction of Newcastle - B?ad4.-
ford I including HagLwioke and Bevon shire) disgruntled, 
and yet, betwixt Newcastle's pique over His loss of the right 
US J 
to name the bishops, and Bedford's desires to treat France 
better than Choisenl's own overtures had stipulated, i t i s 
doubtful whether there was among them f u l l enough agreement 
a 
as to aim or object, to warrant naming tneir opposition^oabal. 
0») 
Tney feared, or affected to fear that peace was being l o s t 
sight of. But neither with them,nor probably with the King 
either, was i t at bottom a question of anxiety for peace. 
P i t t , as they undoubtedly knew, was probably as desirous of 
a " s o l i d peace" as was any man i n the council. Granted that 
the others were equally sincere as to the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 
peace, yet i t i s hardly to be assumed that theya were oblivious 
of the advantage of the policy of posing as those who would 
remove the burdens of war,or aaoonsoious of the handle they 
would have i n the event of an unnecessary protraction of the 
c o n f l i c t . And to balance words against conduct y i t i s 
(1) Of. Ms l e t t e r s Bedford Cor, Vol I I I . 
(2) Kings speech.in AprA^dnfclosing P a r i . - oJUo. 
of. Gent -Mag. Vol 31, ' 
(3) . Dodington p. H-^t, 
(4) B.M. aad.MSS. 32928 f. 362. 
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u s e f u l to r e c a l l that the Duke of Bedford^whose cry for 
peace at almost any price was loudest when P i t t dictated 
conditions, took a considerably altered a t t i t u d e when he was 
negotiator. The exact p o s i t i o n of the King on the peace 
question i s d i f f i c u l t to ascertain i n the absence of almost 
a l l evidence other than h i s accession speech to Parliament, 
- X. .»v.c • « . .t , 
-also ( i n f e r e n t i a l l y ) the statements of -waloontent ministers 
i n September, and h i a rejections of P i t t ' s Spanish demand. 
I f however i t can be assumed that Bute r e a l l y was h i s mouth-
piece, i t would seem that the King's idea was c h i e f l y "to 
C«J-) r 
prevent an increase i n the soope of ^he war, and a growing 
purpose to refuse a renewal of the Prussian, subsidy at the 
approaching expiration of the e x i s t i n g arrangement. 
F i n a l l y then i t i s manifest that p o l i t i c a l plan, or 
systematic i n t r i g u e did not force the retirement of Pitt»-
Tt i s conceded that opposition existed, but likewise that 
i t required the introduction of the Spanish War proposal 
to c r y s t a l l i s e t h i s opposition, to make possible a c o a l i t i o n 
of the d i s a f f e c t e d , and to bring ̂ d efinite expression of 
opinion from the crown. I t hardly needs s t a t i n g , therefore, 
that the second of the two commonly advanced theories - that 
of a diplomatic reason beneath P i t t ' s resignation-remains va-
l i d . In other words, the party opposition was i n c i d e n t a l 
t o , and f i n a l l y e f f e c t i v e only i n connection with the nego-
t i a t i o n s - the foreign p o l i o y of the year. 
(1) Galen. Home O f f i c e Papers 1761 - Cleveland's 'Embassy 
Of al s o Gent•„ Kag. Vol 31 w o . 
(2) Weston Papers Hist. MSS, reports X. 
(3) Cf. Newcastle M8S. Papers,fita±xxMsg 
(4) Gent,Mag. nwx. 
(5) Dodington p, 
(6) ' Ent'iok 91 to 96^ vol. V. 
(7) -a Cf Br. Ultimatum of Angv w i t h Treaty of 1763* 
(7)-b LansdoTOie Papers Hist, Mss. report I I I 131-^.' 
(3) P a r i . H i s t XV 1019 f f \ 
(9) Mar. 26. 
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IS) 
The chief negotiations of 1761 were those with Russia, 
Denmark, the States general, Portugal, and the Barbary 
powers; Secondly . the •unsuccessful efforts for peace; the 
projected Angsburg Congress.but p a r t i c u l a r l y the preliminaries 
s 
with France, and l a s t l y the exchange touching the chronic 
differences with Spain. The improvement of relations, the 
adjustment of standing differences with the neittlraQL maritime 
nations, tearing i n d i r e c t l y at least on the war situation 
by the removal of danger from these quarters i n the oontin-
genoy of a new phase of the struggle, and, too, the indioa-
tions of the King's desire, and perhaps preparations, to 
withdraw active Prussian aid, thereby complicating the pre-
cariousneas of P i t t ' s situation - are alike worth noting. 
At f i r s t blush i t would seem that the French negotiations 
were the v i t a l diplomatic a f f a i r of the moment, and we a y 
admit that in so far as they were accepted as the preliminary 
arrangements f o r the d e f i n i t i v e Treaty of Paris of 1765 
(which was c h i e f l y as respects French concessions) that to 
t h i s extent they were highly si g n i f i c a n t . Nevertheless the 
Spanish War proposal which came as the climax of the com-
p l i c a t i o n and f i n a l wrecking of the peace pour parlers by 
Spanish interferences and the formation of the Family Compact 
waa the real crux of the situation. 
I t w i l l be recalled that the preliminaries of 1761 
began with the formal overtures of Choiseul Mar £5/31 for 
a General Conwresa, at Augsburg, of a l l European combattants 
(1) P i t t Cor. Grimalài to Fuentes. 
(2) Extract from Choiseul l e t t e r s Revue Historique p/10. 
(.3) Pa r i . Hist. ,XV:1045f 
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and active a l l i e s , and simultaneously the preparation of 
a distinct treaty between France andi;England. The agent 
of France was Count*de Bussy, of England Mr Hans Stanley; 
the real negotiators were Choiseul and P i t t . Despite the 
reputed rigorousness of P i t t ' s terms, the progress of the 
negotiations from June u n t i l late August i s apparent evidence 
that peace was sincerely sought, and would have been possible 
save for Spanish meddling. For P i t t ' s demands were not 
extravagant, ne easily could nave placed them higher, while 
Choiseul began with the expectation of admitting f u l l e r 
concessions to P i t t than he would have considered in dealing 
with a pettier man. Consequently when Bussy (July 23} pre-
sented a memorial on behalf of His Catholic Majesty with i t s 
demand for the redress or certain grievances, and i t s hint 
of the consequences or a refusal, he precipitated the prime 
c r i s i s of the negotiations. Yet apparently content with a 
vigorous protest, and the resultant apology or France, P i t t 
oontinued the negotiations u n t i l he had undoubted assurance 
of the f u l l alliance of the Bourbon Llonarchs, when he at once 
recalled his plenipotentiary. 
T,.e Spanish memorial of July 15/23 insisted that a 
guarantee by Spain of the projected treaty was essential 
to the s o l i d i t y of the peace. For France, i t affirmed, 
feared, i f the differences between Spain and Enpland were 
not adjusted, a new war in Europe and America. The points 
of the dissension as intrusted to France by Spain were three: 
" F i r s t , the restitution of some prizes made during the present 
(1) Grenville Papers' I I ; 379-80. 
(2) Pari,Hist. 1133-4. 
(3) Of. Pape^Parl. Hist Vol. XV.'1129-1132, 
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war, on his Catholic Majesty's f l a g , and the satisfaction 
due for the violation of Spanish t e r r i t o r y by the English 
nat vy - Second, the .liberty to the Spanish nation of the 
fishing on the Bank of Newfoundland. Third, The destruction 
of the English establishments forme», on the Spanish t e r r i t o r y 
in the bay of Honduras." 
The memorial of course as regards Spain, was i n s i d -
iously forced into the French negotiations. The method and 
the language used in the presentation of these claims stirred 
the anger of the B r i t i s h Government. By the unanimous vote 
of the Cabinet, P i t t replied to Bussy, indignantly refusing 
to permit the blending of the Spanish dispdte with the peace 
exchanges and denying i n no equivocal words, the presumption 
on the part of France to a right of intermeddling thereafter 
in such disputes. 
The disputes which Spain had sought i n so extraordinary 
a manner to force to an adjustment had been pending for 
upwards of a century. The trouble,long chronic, had l a t e l y 
been growing acute. The dispatch which P i t t sent to Lord 
B r i s t o l therefore reall y involved two considerations. -
F i r s t , an examination of the claims, clearly defining the 
stand of England and seeking to close the trouble. Second, 
a precise expression of B r i t i s h feeling relative to the 
memorial, and a demand for a categorical explanation of 
the Spanish attitude and intent relative to England, desired 
i n consequence of suspicious actions of Spain, and of the 
(1) Pari,Hist, XV;1134-1155 
(S) Bedford Cor, I I I p 101 f f 
(3) Cf. Gent-KagvParlvHistMand a l l contemporary sources used (4) Gent. Mag Vol 31 p 469 " ' \ Entiçk V p. 188ff. 
(5) P i t t Cor. with Colonial Governors Cf. indices. 
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war predictions afloat in London. 
A praper understanding of the issue now v i r t u a l l y 
ahout to he joined would seem to require at least a cursory 
consideration of the status of the claims. Of the three 
points of the July Memorial, one, the complaint of >r*\aritime 
neutrality violations by England i s ostensibly recent. In 
realityi) $t i s an old quarrel i n new guise. Moreover i t , 
l i k e the other two demands, i s merely a single phase of the 
prime question: What was the English status in the "Indies*? 
In other words: How f u l l y could Spain maintain lier exclus!on 
policy i n her colonial empire in the face of B r i t i s h agressive 
enterprise. 
The spoliation claims ±& stated in the Memorial nominally 
\ >»>. , involved fwo points, v i z : indemnity for vessels (or cargoes) 
sttzed, and satisfaction for violation of te r r i t o r y . What 
the basis of the second charge œoy have been i s uncertain. 
in 
In the subsequent conferences between Wall and B r i s t o l i t was 
O) 
not discussed, nor was i t raised by Grimaldi i n the renewed 
(3) 
preliminaries of the Peace of Paris. The statement holds true 
as faras i s ascertainable, as to English discussions of the 
time whether popular or o f f i c i a l . The phrase may have been 
added merely for general effect, whether unguardedly or from 
bravado. Possibly, though, i t may have reference to Adrnrral 
Hawke's cutting-out feat at Alge ç>ras, in which case, knowing 
her own flagrant culpability in many instances, i t may have 
eeem.d imprudent to Spain to dieouse the matter. A e t f l * . 
( l ) -Calendars Colonial State Papers 1 6 6 0 - 1 6 9 8 , 
(E) Commons Journals, 
( 3 ) P i t t Colonial G O T . I p, 1 0 5 (dated 1 6 Sept, I f 5 » ) , 
( 4 ) Order dated 5 Oct. . 1 7 5 6 , 
15-
other point, fnglish violations of neutral commerce seem to 
have heen entirely i n West Indian wat ers, chiefly at the 
beginning of the struggle, and usually i f not always by 
Colonial vessels, commonly rendezvousing in the Bahamas. 
The issuance of letters of torque and reprisal has been an 
English war measure more securely intrenched than the sacred 
acts of Navigation.. n±th the f i r s t adventure of the English 
into the forbidden precinct of the Indies i t became the fav-
orite and most effeotual method of harassing Spain. In fact 
suoh lioensed piracy had frequently been malntaîneë by the 
various interested"^Waritime states - a state of war was re-
garded as existent - on the Spanish Ilia in even in those inter-
vals when the parent countries were a l l at peace. In previous 
wars Parliament had especially fostered the practioe. While, 
of course, in the present contest Spain was a novA-belligerent 
and nominally neutral, the privateers were not noted more 
then than at other times for scrupulous observance of the law. 
For suoh vessels Spain was the inveterate enemy and their 
richest s p o i l . Moreover England notoriously has prefered to 
formulate and define for Herself the rules for tne status of 
Neutral maritime rights and contraband of war. At the very 
outset of the war a general order had been sent out to the 
Colonial governors and admiralty officers giving regulations 
for properly handling the subject. Whether the order was 
more stringent than usual, or whether,as was claimed, the 
Spanish vessels captured were usually carrying cargoes ac-
t u a l l y contraband, and often were i n r e a l i t y Prenoh boats 
(1Î P i t t Cor w i t h C o l o n i a l Governors I p.105 etc. 
(2) i h i d , Vol, I passim, 
(3) By Spain, 
(4) Pari. H i s t , XV: 1130, 
(5) Ibid(il34 to 43, 
(6) I M d 1147. 
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obligingly furnished with Spanish papers, t h i s i s true 
that offences were committed "by the E n g l i s ^ i n consequence 
of whioh P i t t , upon representations made by D'AbreTOn had 
several times to issue general and specific instructions, 
sternly denoujoing the practices, and ordering s t r i c t care by 
the colonial governors to prevent the offenses and to bring 
the offenders to summary punishment. The replies Tèroeived 
indioate that the majority of the complaints s p e c i f i c a l l y 
named were baseless. In some 'instances no suoh vessel had 
been taken, or else i t was legally taken, while certain vessels 
the Spanish claimant had f a i l e d or refused to l i b e l . In 
about a l l the valid oases, Justice already had been done, or 
was pending. Comprehensive data relative to these cases can-
not be obtained unless from tne admiralty papers; however, there 
i s l i t t l e question that Pitt,despite allegations to the con-
trary, sincerely endeavored to remove a l l ground for complaint 
on thiB score and to conciliate Spain^ S t i l l , while he sought 
to expedite the delivery of justice in suoh cases, he insisted, 
nevertheless, that by international law Spain must recognize 
the competence of the B r i t i s h Admir al ty Courts to handle 
suoh matters, certainly without appeal to extraneous courts. 
Especially was the hin& of reference to an actual enemy, pre-
posterous and a hurt to national honor. In accordance with 
very e x p l i c i t instructions from P i t t dated 28 July.Lord B r i s t o l 
(Ambassador to Spain) so presented the oase, and General Wall 
i n reply, admitted perforce that Spain must in propriety await 
( 1 ) Pari* Hist. Y i l Jkp. 
(£) Parl vHist, X V ; 1 1 4 7 and 
(3) DaUKoeh^Schoell I I Chap. 1 6 , 
( 4 ) Harrisse x 
( 5 ) Prowse Chap*III c£,esp. the Spanish sources quoted. 
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th e decision of the English prize courts, and that his king 
assuredly had no idea of appeal to the judicature of V e r s a i l -
l e s . In f i n e , Spain thus admitted that upon this point the 
grievance was not material enough for insistence. 
The next point i n the "Memorial", the claim to a share 
i n the Newfoundland f i s h e r i e s , seems f i r s t to have become a 
diplomatic question - probably f i r s t appeared as a matter 
U) 
of moment ~ in the negotiations and public discussions i n -
cident to the Treaty of Utrecht. For one thing Spain had 
a r e a l desire for a secure participation i n fi s h e r i e s of so 
peculiar moment to her Basque seamen. Again i t was of i n -
terest to a l l Spaniards as Catholics from necessity for the 
f i s h as an a r t i c l e of food. However she was f u l l y aware^ 
also^ of the value of a well-supported, or at least long-
mantained pretension of t h i s sort as an effset to B r i t i s h 
accroachments, or mercantile claims of somewhat analogous 
nature i n the Caribbean and Gulf regions. She desired an 
excuse for terminating - or at l e a s * an equivalent for s t i l l 
permitting - the concessions extorted by England in the 
Colonial treaty of 1670 and the assiente and annual ship 
stipulations of 1713, i n so far as they were kept v a l i d by 
subsequent conventions. The prime basis of the Spanish 
fishery case i s the p r i o r i t y and continuity of Basque f i s h i n g 
voyages to the Newfoundland region. Their e a r l i e s t cruises 
l i k e those of the Bretons may have antedated the discovery 
by Cabot, but fro. sue* l 9 e e I i a a r y a m t g „ ^ 
Prowse Hist, or Newfoundland. Chap, I I I & of, index. 
impassible to guess whether they visited the Grand Ban|( or 
perchance the neighboring coasts. B U B suoh voyages i f 
oredible must have been isolated, and i f from policy details 
thereof were suppressed ? or not ? at least no Interest was 
arrouBed e'ven i n the home d i s t r i o t . Any general Basque i n -
terest dates from about 1545 after which a marked desertion 
of old fishing graunds near Ireland followed. They fished 
the shores of Newfoundland chiefly for cod, the Gulf of 
St. Lawrence, Belle Isle Straiifeh and the Labrador coast 
waters f o r cod also, but chiefly for whales. Their fleets 
were more numerous tnan those of the English, French or 
Portuguese; some years in the reign of Elizabeth they were 
having as high as two hundred ships to f i f t y of the English. 
But the halpyon period of their fisheries was terminated by 
the destruction of the Armada, although after 1588 some 
boats orept back, and through French protection or general 
sufferance the voyages were resumed on a small soale, and 
were continued pr a c t i c a l l y unmolested for more than a cen-
tury, The authentic discovery by Cabot, and olaim then as-
serted', regular voyages to )and early occupation of the 
island,-gave the sovereignty to England, disputed only by 
the French on the west ooast. The Bisoayners, l i k e the 
Portuguese, never sought to occupy in the region, and thus 
BO long as few oame and but for the season, their voyages 
we>ra scarcely noticed, during the l t t h , century, either by 
Spain, i n meeting whose demands for baoallao t h e i r small catoh 
( 1 ) Statutes at Largs 1 0 & 11-Wm. I l l Chap XXV^Sec. 1 , 
l a s t clause. 
(2) Pari.Hist,VII Appendix LXX, I. 
(3) Pari.Hist, VII App. 
(4) Gommons Journals Vol. 1 7 - 348. 
( 5 ) P a r i . Hist. VII App. LXX ft-
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oounted l i t t l e , of by England as yet l i t t l e aware of the 
possible value of her possession. The growth of the conti-
nental Colonies of Britain - Especially New England - brought 
with i t a real exploitation of the northern fisheries. 
The seamen of west England also - the pioneers - were s t i l l 
awake to th e i r opportunity. Then more and more ins i s t e n t l y 
i t was impressed upon King and Council that "The Fishery" 
was a peculiar treasure to be maintained inviolate for 
Englishmen. Rights and sovereignty already held were safe-
guarded by statutes such as the law of 10 and 11 William I I I , 
while the acquisition of yet more exclusive rights became 
an important object i n negotiations with France, The Kew-
cn 
found land law of William I I I regulating the fishery was 
rê ujÉ&id to interdict participation to a l l aliens. Though 
promulgated at a time when Anglo-Spanish relations were very 
dlose, i t evidently brought no protest from Spain. Doubtless 
however, the law was not Vigorously enforced. At length i n 
oonsequenoe of a memorial from the Marquis Monteleone pre-
senting the Spanish claim, instructions were given the Lords 
of Trade to investigate the matter thoroughly.3»Lord Dartmouth 
from the Board, June 13,17 12/13, freported substantially, 
that they had found that some Spaniards had been going to 
Hewfoundland with passes forain "her Majesty" t^ueen Anne]] 
some might have xa±±« fished privately, but none claimed i t 
as a right. Spain followed up t h i s memorial and secured i n 
the treaty of Streoht an a r t i o l . (no 15). oonflrmlnf to t h . 
P a r i , Hi st„ XV.' 1147. 
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Biseayners and Guispusooans such share i n the fishery as 
they might claim by right. This a r t i c l e was one of the 
rocks of offense to the Parliamentary committee!of inves-
t i g a t i o n , who Beared that Spain might hase a pretense upon 
t h i s clause, which claim was contrary to a r t i c l e s 7 and 8 
of S i r Wm. GodolplAns treaty of 8/18 July 1670, counter 
to the Dartmouth report, and i n vi o l a t i o n of the Statute 
of William I I I . I t was maintained i n rebuttal, however, 
that since no v a l i d right did now exist, the treaty clause 
olearly confirmed nothing. I t was so interpreted by Great 
B r i t a i n thenoeforward and the contention being kept smoulder-
ing by the simple reaffirmation of the Utrecht treaty i n 
thus 
a l l intervening conventions haft flared up Aagain i n 1761. 
This time the claim, which before had been asked merely for 
the "Bay" privinoes was set up for tne whole Spanish Nation. 
Like demand was largely bravado -"a bluff". Charles I I I 
seems to have experienced d i f f i c u l t y i n impressing the 
B r i t i s h government. Of course, too, a large claim could be 
compromised advantageously. And yet Wall i n his resultant 
interviews with B r i s t o l merely puts forward the old claim. 
B r i s t o l then in l i n e with his orders from P i t t absolutely 
denied that any such right ever had been admitted, often as 
i t had been asserted, and reiterated the utter impossibility 
of making such a grant now. Wall in reply said that the 
baaallao was as much desired by the Spaniards, as was the 
logwood by the B r i t i s h , and that the Newfoundland rights 
Bedford Gor. I l l p. 101-13, 144 f f . 
But while properly s t r e s s i n g t i i i s p o i n t , i t must be re-
c a l l e d that the grievance was a r e a l one to both nations. 
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fo r Spain were as v a l i d as any B r i t i s h rights i n Yucatan. 
CM 
In 1762 Grimaldi again revived this demand, i n s i s t i n g so 
obstinately as to threaten the issue of the peace negotiations 
and eventually compelling Louis to command his signature to 
- • • * i . the treaty which, i n effect terminated the claim. From the 
whole tenor of Wall's argument i n 1761, however, i t i s e v i -
dent that his second demand,like the f i r s t , was not i n i t s e l f 
a sine qua nov» with Spain. I t was probably .above a23, i n -
tended to serve as an exchange for English renunciation of 
the logwood cutting franchisé .^doubtless with keen r e a l i z a t i o n 
that the fishery was a tender suVjeot for England. Inevitably 
also the frequent renewal of such claim, could but intensify 
the mutual i l l w i l l of the countries. 
The Honduras question i s one of those matters which 
have had an influence on diplomacy and events •' utterly 
disproportionate with any i n t r i n s i c importance of t h e i r own. 
England asserted a right secured by treaty to cut logwood -
to be shipped to England and Holland for dyeing purposes -
i n the unoccupied t e r r i t o r i e s of the Yuoatan Peninsula, about 
the Bays of Campeaohy and Honduras. But England v i r t u a l l y 
had to admit that her t i t l e was somewhat clouded : that 
o r i g i n a l l y she nad stolen i n , that the repuv*te"o. confirmât ions 
of her privil e g e s were merely by inference, that tnese 
privil e g e s had been flagrantly abused. The exact date of 
B r i t i s h entrance into the Honduras region i s undertain-
Probably the f i r s t logwood voyages began 1663 - 5 to Cape 
Catoohe. In time the sphere of cutting was transferred to 
(1) Calendars Colonial fapers Am .West Indies(1660-1698 
Cf. i n d i c e s , 
( 2 ) Roseherj Bourne Gh. XIX^Moses; 
(3) P a r i * Hist, X p,V32 etc. 
(4) <Entick V-.192*7. 
(5) Calndrs. Colonial Papers. 
( 6 i lucas Vol, I I ChapV IX v
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the north shore of Yuoatan on the Bay of Campeachy and when 
fresh forests were desired removal was made to the region 
of the Bay and Gulf of Honduras north of the Mosquito coast. 
With the proclamation of peace between England and Spain f o r 
both Europe and America the swarm of "privateers" which had 
infested West Indian waters for the many long years of war, 
were forced to settle down as planters i n recently-taken 
Jamaica, become legitimate seamen, or remain pirates and 
openly hoist the black f l a g . Many of the middle type kept 
t h e i r vessels and returning to their old rendezvous on the 
Honduras coast began cutting and carrying logwood to Jamaica* 
for trans-shipment to England. For this carrying trade many 
New England vessels i n time resorted to Jamaica, as well as 
English ships, and some of these out t h e i r own wood. Under 
the regulations of the Qasa ae Contratasioja a l l foreign sea-
men found upon the Spanish Main were to be treated as pirates. 
Attempts to secure commercial arrangements for England with 
Spain or her possessions was long i n vain. F i n a l l y i n 1667 
a commercial treaty was made between the two nations, but 
i t s p e c i f i c a l l y exempted the colonies from i t s provisions. 
July 8/18,1670, however, England f i n a l l y succeeded in wring-
ing from Spain, who was unable to cope with the state of 
a f f a i r s i n the Caribbean, a treaty oonrirming a l l t e r r i t o r y , 
rights and privileges held by either, i n statu quo. Notice 
seems^not to have been taken u n t i l t h i s year of the logwood 
expéditions and the temporary settlements of the cutters i n 
Vol, 17 of Commons Journals, 
Pa r i . Hist. VII App,LXX, 
Del&oh I I p. 122 etc , 
P a r i Hist, X Debates, i n 1738 vp} 562-787. 
DeKoch II p. 280 etc. 
Commons Journals Vol, 17, 
Burrows Foreign Policy of G-tB»r. chaps. IV & V, 
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Yucatan. In 1672 a cedula of the Queen regent forbade the 
trade, and ships were taken and cargoes confiscated. At 
suoh times England protested to Spain, f o r although p u b l i c l y 
forbidding the practice, she r e a l l y connived at i t . A f t e r 
a time the Spanish l o c a l authorities also usually winked at 
the trade. Meanwhile the settlements spread and became 
somewhat permanent. 
Legally, however, the question continued on very much 
the same basis. From 1672-1713 England could have found 
no opportunity, either because of conditions at home or i n 
Spain to bring the matter to a settlement. An a r t i c l e of 
the Treaty of Utrecht confirmed the t r e a t i e s of 1667 and 
1670 with the addition: "without prejudice to any l i b e r t y 
or power which the subjects of Great B r i t a i n have enjoyed 
CO 
either through r i g h t , sufferance or tolerance", while other 
a r t i c l e s contained mutual guarantees of the t e r r i t o r i a l 
status quo, and commercial privil e g e s of both parties. 
But the separate a r t i c l e s of the "assients" and **annual 
ship" further complicated the matter. The f r i c t i o n , a r i s i n g 
from the seizure of logwood vessels and maltreatment of the 
cutters being merged i n the whole i l l i c i t trade controversy. 
This Spanish depredation dispute beginning about 1715 had 
brought orises i n 1721 and 1728, and especially i n 1738. 
Then i n a long debate in Parliament, Walpoles peace p o l i c y 
was denasmheoed. Resolutions and an address were adopted 
asserting B r i t i s h rights i n Yucatan and Tortugas and to 
certain commercial p r i v i l e g e s as indisputable and desiring 
(1) Pari, Hist, JOE .'1146. 
(S) Weston Papers Hist MSS, Eept. X pv 218 -21 
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that the government press Spain for a settlement of olaims. 
However the treaty of Aix-la-Ohapelle merely secured the 
Tortugas with i t s sal t ^ l e a v i n g the Honduras as the £ust 
previous convention had doneTon the basis of 1670 and 1713. 
English r i g h t s i n Campeaohy, and for that matter her owner-
ship of Jamaioa;were but i n f e r e n t i a l l y granted. It i s true 
that royal oedulas had been issued from time to time under 
protect permitting the cutting of logwood and necessary 
establishments for the trade within specified l i m i t s . 
Cedulas, however, were revocable at the royal w i l l . They 
did not insure immunity from the attacks of guarda costas, 
or forces of c o l o n i a l intendants. Moreover the l i m i t s were 
too olose, new forests were often needed. So E n g l i s h - l i k e 
the settlements increased and were f o r t i f i e d , l o c a l government 
was established and with an extra-legal dependence on Jamaica, 
and d i s t r i c t by d i s t r i c t the area of occupation was extended. 
Spain made diplomatio protests i n vain. She destroyed 
settlements to f i n d them r e b u i l t directly^and secured against 
attack, i f she determined on general cooperated measures 
against the interlopers, strenuous complaints from England 
usually caused her to revise or defer such a p o l i c y and re-
ooending her orders to f a l l back upon the plan of occaa i o n a l , 
unexpected harassment. 
Thus i t was P i t t found the a f f a i r i n 1757. To h i s 
suggestion through Keens of an Anglo-Spanish a l l i a n c e , Gen. 
Wall answered that the English attitude on t h i s mooted 
(l) French Instructions to ̂ VmhassOLdors XII his 337-41», 
( 2 ) Pi t t Cor, IX 
( 3 ) Pari,' Hi st. XV ! 1132, 
(4) i h i d 1147. 
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question made i t impossible f o r him to consider the proposal. 
P i t t s e f f e r of reparation f o r enoroachments, and the evacua-
t i o n of unauthorized establishments made sinoe .1748 on the 
Mosquito coast, and i n the Bay of Honduras was r e j e c t e d , 
although wade in consequence of the proposal from D'Abreu. 
Al s o Wall disavowed D'Abreu's aotions. With the coming of 
Ghairxes I I I to the Spanish throne i n 1759 the matter again 
became aoute. Charles had previously offered h i s s e r v i c e s 
as mediator between England and France which George I I had 
refused. January 1760, Count Fuentes was sent to London 
to succeed D'Abreu as ambassador. His orders were s t r i c t . 
He was to repeat the o f f e r of mediation, and to secure set-
tlement of the grievances, e s p e c i a l l y evacuation of the 
Honduras establishments. In September 1760, a f t e r the death 
of the Queen who had favored Wall's p o l i c y f o r peace, the 
King deoided on an aggressive a t t i t u d e toward England. 
Settlements on the Rio Campeaohy were destroyed, and an 
energetic note was delivered by Fuentes. P i t t answered with 
a sharp "response verbale". Whe»; the matter continued 
thus w i t h no prospect of settlement u n t i l the next J u l y , the 
p r o t e s t was lodged again through Franoe, as has been seen. 
B r i s t o l ' s answer was the proposal to evacuate new settlements, 
and to destroy f o r t i f i c a t i o n s i f previously Spain would u t t e r 
a formal r e c o g n i t i o n of E n g l i s h r i g h t s . This Wall declared 
impossible - absurd - as w e l l might a housebreaker agree to 
go out again ; provided f i r s t he had been given what he entered 
(1) Hov; H i s t . Vol, 94, 
(2) Bedford Oor, 111:145 etc. 
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f o r . The oedulas were s u f f i c i e n t guarantee. English i n -
sistence upon a guarantee made i t look as i f she were holding 
on to force agreement to English terms - whioh might mean 
sovereignty -/ meanwhile she was constantly increasing- her 
sphere of occupation. Doubtless there existed grounds f o r 
Wall's suspicion. S t i l l P i t t was probably sincere i n d e s i r -
ing an adjustment on his terms, which lie had good reason to 
suppose the only seoure basis f o r settlement, which would 
conserve long-sanctioned B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . While indeed 
Sept. 28,—too l a t e to reach England u n t i l a fortnight a f t e r 
P i t t ' s withdrawal-, a proposition was made to guarantee the 
logwood i f England ordered removal from the Bio Tinto, Pio 
WalH and Laguna Azul, i t i s doubtful)even supposing the 
form and soope of the proposition to have been j u s t , whether 
Spain was sincere enough i n her o f f e r to have insured f i n a l i t y 
f o r the arrangement. Like the French ultisslmum, Spain's 
proposal may have been offering i n the confident assuranoe 
that i t vfould ba .rejected. For i t i s doubtful whether Spain 
would have consented to any peaceful settlement much short 
of English abandonment of the region. - Indeed a f t e r the war 
had brought her suoh speedy and sharp defeat, i t was only 
with d i f f i c u l t y that a recognition of the status QJIO was 
exerted i n the Treaty of 1763. Nor was the f u l l e r guarantee 
i n 1783 the ultimate settlement of the question. I t would 
perhaps be d i f f i c u l t to determine whioh nation was the greater 
aggressor. This at least can be said that both nations 
(1) Lecky I I I p 34 
(S) Fr.'instructions XII bis 338 
(3) Rev. Hist Toi 94 p 1-
(4) I.e. assignment - cnoice of men f o r station, whicb 
was probably grain fortuitous. 
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considered that they had herein a r e a l agrievanoea 
Having thus traoed the fundamentals of the Spanish 
question, l e t us r e c a p i t u l a t e . Of the three grievances 
set f o r t h through the medium of France, we have sean that 
the s p o l i a t i o n s demand was admitted by Spain aè l a r g e l y 
improper, that the Newfoundland claim was specious, merely 
advanced as an e f f s e t to the Honduras question, which was 
a r e a l and chronic grievance. That, however, Spain would 
have made i t a Casus " b e l l i , except as a result of other 
i n f l u e n c i n g motives, i s quite improbable. But Charles I I I 
had other grudges against England. He had not forgotten the 
threatened bombardment of Naples, nor the curt r e j e c t i o n 
of h i s twice offered mediation. Spain wanted to regain 
G i b r a l t a r , and Jamaica — t o recompense her honor. I t was 
h i g h l y desirable f o r various reasons to detaoh Portugal from 
England. E s p e c i a l l y , however, had the often repeated French-
i n s i n u a t i o n s , and the spectacle of the vast conquests of 
Great B r i t a i n roused Spanishjealousy and apprehension. Tt 
seemed more and more apparent that Spain must j o i n France 
to put a term to B r i t i s h expansion. The threatened Indies 
must be saved, and England must give up the footholds she 
haa?*£n°ftie Spanish colonies. The |Jamily compact was the l o g -
i c a l r e s u l t . -jjjf 
For the negotiation of t h i s most famous of Bourbon 
pactes de f a m i l l e , the d i s p o s i t i o n of diplomats was most 
Fr* "instructions XII bis 352, 
i b i d 337-341, 
Also Fr. Instructions v o l v I I I . 
-28-
favorable. While chief credit f o r tne conception and oon$ 
summation of the a l l i a n c e belongs to Choiseul and Grimaldi^ 
yet l e s s conspicuously Fuentes, D'Ossua, and Wall, each 
i n h i s own part contributed toward tne r e s u l t . The a l l i a n c e 
was foreshadowed by the intention of h i s Catholic Majesty, 
at the suggestion of Choiseul,to make his pupposed mediation 
an armed one. Again, thruoughout the Autumn of 1760, he 
was beginning preparations f o r war, avowing his purpose no 
longer to tranokle to B r i t i s h insolence. Although i n con-
sequence of these plans, he f e l t obliged to refuse a subsidy 
to France^nevertheless i n December he removed the duty on 
French goods sent overland to Cadis. Then Jan. 27,1761 
CP Choiseul authorized D'Ossuu (who, bythe way^had been trans-
fe r r e d by request of Chas. I l l when that King l e f t Naples 
f o r h i s new realm i n 1759) to propose the negotiation of a 
defensive treaty intended to consolidate the union of the 
two courts,^ also a commercial treaty. That Charles was 
already favorable i s evinced by the l e t t e r s of credence given 
^ Grimaldi. I t was 9th. Feb. when D'OssuU reported the request 
of the King f o r an outline of the proposed t r e a t i e s . Then 
a few dat/r l a t e r Grimaldi - perhaps l a r g e l y on h i s own 
i n i t i a t i v e - proposed to Choiseu3i, an. offensive t r e a t y be-
tween Spain and France f o r sustaining the common i n t e r e s t s 
of both orowns against England. Most readily Choiseul r e -
\\) sponded and drew up a project of an offensive and defineive 
a l l i a n c e whioh he sent to D'Ossuu, 3rd. March. A f t e r the 
opening of the peaoe conferences Charles decided he had 
best confine himself to a simple defensive treaty. Choiseul 
then offered to conclude two agreements, the f i r s t a per-
petual family compact or tne Bou*hon sovereigns, and no others, 
the other tka a defensive treaty safeguarding the r i g h t s of 
the signatories, i n dealings with other nations: These 
projects were accepted almost i n entirety at once, yet minor 
points delayed the consummation of the f i n a l t r e a t i e s thru-
out the Summer. At length, Açj|nat 15th, was signed the 
Family compact with defensive and offensive clauses e f f e c t i v e 
a f t e r the next Peace; also a secret convention by whioh 
Spain agreed to declare war on EnglançkjUnless she made 
peaoa by the f i r s t day of May 1762, i n r e q u i t t a l f o r which 
declaration France should oede Mintnjca to Spain. At the 
same time a secret a r t i c l e was made whereby Portugal should 
be offored adhesion to the compact, or war. Word was sent 
to Spain of the signature, 18 August, and Charles sent his 
r a t i f i c a t i o n 27th. August. 
Whether for the consummation of t h i s negotiation 
Choiseul should be highly praised or censured, i s immaterial, 
here. In either case the onus of the judgaant must be 
shared with Grimaldi, at le a s t . What Choiseul*s r e a l pur-
poses were, must remain largely conjectural. Probably, how-
ever, there are no positive grounds for denying the patriotism 
of h i s motives, or the s i n c e r i t y of h i s desire f o r peace 
with England and Prussia. There may be tru t h also i n 
Cf. V/addington's ramarks in Transactions .Royal Hist. So-
ciety 1908. Also see Reviews of h i s / L a Guerre 
de Sept .-Ans* Çf„ Eng.Hist Rev. Jan. 190? p, 161~7. 
Rev. Hist. Vol, 98, 
Ib i d p. 7. Cf. Çhoiseiû/s opinion. 
t ,1. -See Appendix. 
V/alpole's Geo, I I I p. 97, 
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Choiseul's statement that he reluctantly agreed, to t h i s 
expedient which possibly would prolong the war, and that he 
suspected that Spain, i n the t e s t , would afford l i t t l e help, 
0 ) 
I f however, Choiseul did expect some immediate advantage f o r 
France from t h i s b r i l l i a n t stroke of diplomacy he speedily 
was disappointed. I f he had hoped by h i s finesse to be i n 
p o s i t i o n to force a satisfactory issue from h i s negotiations 
with P i t t he had over-reached himself. Scarcely had the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n s of the Çaots been exchanged when P i t t abruptly 
. . . • * 
terminated negotiations, and r e c a l l e d Stanley. Then began 
the months dispute i n the B r i t i s h Cabinet aver the proposed 
Spanish War - the meetings of 19 and E l September, and the 
w e l l known culmination 8 Oct. The coincidence of events i s 
s t r i k i n g . That there must have been some underlying, connec-
t i o n between the Bourbon a l l i a n c e , and P i t t ' s projected po-
l i c y i s obvious. Again, P i t t ' s suspicions of Spain's pur-
poses and the wisdom of h i s plans f o r combatting her designs 
were f u l l y sustained by ensuing events - despite the f a i l u r e 
of h i s colleagues to agree with him. Evidently, then,Pitt's 
p o l i c y was founded on more than mere shrewdness. The query 
therefore i s : What information did he have^and how had he 
obtained i t ? 
That P i t t had early trustworthy information of the se-
tu-) 
oret compact of 15 August i s now undoubted. Opinions d i f f e r 
as to the scope and source of t h i s information. Walpole i n 
il) Adolphu* I 41 to 45 « 
Lecky III : 36 . 
Manendi ̂ Quarterly Hew. Oct 1899* 
(2) Green : Chatham. 
Cf. Review of hooks i n Quarterly Rev. Oot 1908, 
(3) Walpole Geo II I Vol I p 97 note. 
(4) Weston Papers, Styèwart Papers.also Elphinstone Papers — 
Hist. MSS. Repotts. i*y "n: 
(5) P i t t Cor. Vol IIp,140 Note. 
(6) Cf. Eng. Hist Rev. XXI B.M. add. MSS. #32928 ff, 225-26 
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"Memoirs of Geo. I l l " Bays that Mr. P i t t by a "masterpiece 
of i n t e l l i g e n c e " had early knowledge of the a l l i a n c e of 
Spain and France. Secondary historians apparently with 44rfr-
£le--~deviatio» have done l i t t l e mcfre than paraphrase t h i s 
statement, supplementing i t possibly with the supposition 
that Stanley sent t h i s information from P a r i s , or that per-
haps E a r l Marisohal Keith, grateful'for the removal of his 
Jacobite outlawry sent P i t t a copy of the Compact xxxx from 
Spain, While a comparatively l a t e theory has been advanced, 
that such a copy was sent by Louis Dutens, secretary of the 
B r i t i s h embassy i n Turin. And, thus, indeed the statements 
of the more reoent writers i n general do not d i f f e r e s s e n t i a l -
l y from those of the e a r l i e r historians. 
I t i s improbable, judging both from external and i n -
t e r n a l evidence, that P i t t had seen either a oopy or a f u l l 
outline of the compact i n Sept. 1761. The only evidence 
Cs\ 
i n support or the Keith idea i s a statement i n a scanty 
memoir, while nothing at a l l i ndicative of suoh a service 
appears in his l e t t e r s . ""Wlpreover i t i s not certain that Keith 
was i n Spain at that time. The Dutens thesis f a i l s of ac-
ceptance, for ttae evidence i s palpably weak at the essential 
point. I t seems to depend too l a r g e l y upon the"suggestive 
n 
method of i t s exposition to create an impression that every-
thing has been proven. As to Stanley, that he sent word of 
some suoh treaty i s known, hut the imperfect information i n 
h i s l e t t e r of End. Sept., of i t s e l f (alone) i s not adequate 
( l ) Of. Eng.EistvRev. XXI B.M. add. MSS,32928 f f , 225-26, 
xfcx Granville Papers Vol.I t386, 
Weston Papers* ^U>.T(\SS. (^0<J^JCC-
2) See Appendix for discussion 
3) Hotably by Winstanley i n Eng. Hist. Rev, Vol, x v i i , 
(4) P i t t Cor, I I p. 89. 
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f o r an explanation of the extent or the date of P i t t ' s 
knowledge of the situation. The advioe whioh he drew up 
to give the King (18 Sept.), and the confidential arguments 
i n the Cabinet in support of such advice, the points - as 
to motive, intent and methods - i n each case being e s s e n t i a l -
l y the same, indicate no such peculiar points as possession 
of the treaties of 15 August would afford.* Moreover the 
paper and arguments are not only consistent, with eaoh other; 
buj/also consonant with JBitt's entire Spanish policy that 
other explanation seems necessary. 
In the col l e c t i o n of P i t t ' s correspondenoe published 
i n 1838 i s a series of apparently intercepted l e t t e r s between 
Fuentes^Spanish ambassador to Great Britain )and Gen. Wall, 
the Spanish Foreign Minister, and also between Fuentes and 
Grimaldi, representative of Spain at Ver s a i l l e s . This cor-
respondence which illuminâtes the mooted question seems to 
tf^have been overlooked, or so obscurely mentioned, i n such 
oonneotion as to carry no significance, although i t has been 
u t i l i z e d i n support of other hypotheses, even where i t s 
competency as evidence might be tittpugned. 
V.4) 
The f i r s t of these l e t t e r s - Fuentes to Wall }23rd. Jan. 
1761 i s of interest here, merely as indicating that Fuentes 
expects no justice for Spain from P i t t , ax* who seems a l l - . 
powerful and i s backed by Bute (jiot yet of the inner Cabinet^; 
while the other party [of Hewcastle and Devonshire"} do not 
oppose him hoping to see some consequence re s u l t , ending i n 
his f a l l . 
ïTuenifes ' s 
( l ) Citations for the .letters quoted from $±k± Correspondence 
hereafter, are : 
P i t t Cor. I I p, 91> 
" p. 9£. 
". p, 95-
" p, 96* 
" p, 98-
" p, 100. 
" p, 105-
" p, 137. 
p> 139, " p 14E. 
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The f i r s t hin"fe of the future "Compact" comes i n a 
seoond l e t t e r dated 15th. Feb., wherein Grimaldi a f t e r 
discussing the prospects of early French o v e r t u r e s , t e l l * 
Fuentes that he w i l l not " f a i l t r y i n g to take measures 
with t h i s Cïrenoh3 people", Says he, " I t i s certain we have 
thought of i t a l i t t l e l a t e . I don't know whether our 
court w i l l come into i t , hut I think i t my duty to propose 
what may he useful to us and I judge i t necessary without 
exposing the King". 
Writing again 26th. Feb. to Fuentes, Grimaldi after 
noting the earnest desire of France f o r peace, gives his 
opinion of the p o s s i b i l i t y of f a i l u r e yet, although i t i s 
considered certain i n ffranoe on the purposed off e r of terms. 
He continues,"In consideration of t h i s ^ and of our sit u a t i o n 
I begin working on making some a l l i a n c e with France to 
protect us from those accidents we ought to fear." Whether 
they succeed or not, since France objects that Spain,having 
waited u n t i l she i s destroyed, i s now too l a t e , i t i s s t i l l 
necessary to dissemble that the project be not suspected. 
There i s good chance, he thinks of separating France and 
l u s t c r i a , since France complains that the a l l i a n c e has 
greatly hurt her, and she i s not bound by treaty. 
In a t h i r d l e t t e r (5 Mar.) Grimaldi t e l l s Fuentes he 
has despatched three messengers to Spain"to sow seeds of 
an a l l i a n c e with France", the result of which action he 
w i l l duly report. He thinks i t important to engage France 
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"before she makes peaoe, for afterwards i t i s doubtful i f 
she w i l l go to war again for Spain's sake. The notion of 
a peaoe congress continues, "but for a l l this peace i s not 
made"• 
Fuentes i n turn, 10th. March, acknowledges the need 
of secrecy, discusses the proposed negotiations, doubting 
a successful outcome, and especially deprecates the eagerness 
of Franoe for peaoe as playing d i r e c t l y into the "Hands of 
the B r i t i s h ministry, hence d i r e c t l y contrary to the i n t e r -
ests of France - and Spain. Of G-rimalde's project he says; 
" I t i s certain that we hare l o s t time but th i s i s our 
opportunity". France w i l l not loose and may gain by con-
tinuing the war i f Spain enters i t . The r i s k of Spain w i l l 
not be great i f she i s assured by an alliance stipulating ± 
that one s h a l l not leave the other. At the end of the year 
both can hare a peace to s u i t . He i s persuaded that only 
force and fear w i l l make the B r i t i s h ministers do Spain 
j u s t i c e . The Spanish preparations are talked of i n London, 
but nothing has been said to him. I t should be Brimaldfc's 
aim - he thinks - to persuade France that Spain takes part 
with her" from affection and policy,not from necessity i n 
order to settle the Cspanish} pretensions with t h i s 
CBritishJ Ministry". 
March 17th replying to Grimaldfc's l e t t e r of 5th I.Tarch 
after repeating his opinions as to the peace pour pariera 
(1) Calendar.Home Office Papers 1761 no. 246, 
(E) n " " 1761 nos. 202 & 214, 
^ ^ S b u ^ . V I - N O O O V ^ J U ^ ^ ^ r U - ^bd^, 
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Fuentes closes:"If we behave with proper resolution and i f 
the Court of France thinks and acts as i t ought I promise 
myself great s a t i s f a c t i o n and the greatest of a l l w i l l be 
to reduoe t h i s nation to proper l i m i t s and to reason". 
iPuentes next on his part"sows seeds" f o r the project 
with h i s oourt, i n a l e t t e r to Gen. Wall 20th. Mar. He 
deprecates the rumors of peace as favorable to England, 
detrimental to France and Spain, while delay would cause 
party d i v i s i o n s i n England to bring on C i v i l war. Every 
day he i s more convinced that " t h i s i s the opportunity f o r 
us to obtain justice and reduce t h i s nation to i t s due 
l i m i t s . I f France continues the war we can cooperate 
more at ease, however the blow i s not les * c e r t a i n i f the 
King i s w i l l i n g to st r i k e i t alone". 
Writing again to Wall(£7th. Mar.) Fuentes recounts the 
active war movements i n England and discusses the changes 
and factions i n B r i t i s h Cabinet. He dwells upon P i t t ' s 
avoidance of him, and surmises that P i t t i s waiting word from 
B r i s t o l , ox" the effect of the peace overtures, i n Spain •» 
" f l a t t e r i n g us now i n order to make fools of us afterwards, 
when they are persuaded we s h a l l not t a l k so big". 
Whether the correspendents, becoming waryt succeeded 
do 
i n covering t h e i r l i n e of communication f o r a time, or that 
P i t t for some reason found i t inexpedient to interoept -
for a time - we do not know; but we f i n d no l e t t e r s from 
the close of March u n t i l the one of 7th. Aug. from Wall to 
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Fuente8, called out by P i t t ' s l a t t e r to B r i s t o l (28th.July) 
oompllining of the Bussy note, and of Tarions suspicious 
preparations making i n Spain - to meet a l l which complaints 
Wall suggests certain plausible but evasive explanations 
which Fuentes i s to make - seemingly to Bute. 
A despatch from Grimaldi to Fuentes 31st. .Aug. shows 
the consummation of th e i r projeot. He has a l e t t e r from 
Frentes of 25th Aug. and the advices of whioh he has deemed 
so important as to forward them by courier to Spain, he 
has compared Sussex's advioes with those of Frentes, with 
whioh they agree. The answer to be given B r i s t o l ( lie 
learns from Wall) w i l l follow the advice given by Fuentes. 
Spain has fears for the Indies f l e e t . "They want time there 
u n t i l she i s arrived at Cadiz and are privately sending 
twelve ships as oonvoy". Then referring to another l e t t e r 
from Fuentes expressing fears as to whether Franoe i s bound 
to Spain by the Family Compact and convention, he replies: 
"there i s no longer ground for t h i s fear since both i n s t r u -
ments were signed on the 15th. and I expect shortly the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n . " An a r t i c l e previously sent makes i t clear 
that Franoe cannot f i n i s h the war without Spanish a f f a i r s 
being settled. Bussy has had such orders. 
The l a s t of these l e t t e r s , dated 13th Sppt.,also 
.ffrimaldiV.^to Fuentes, says i n discussing the French 
reply to the B r i t i s h ultimatum that Choiseul yields a l l 
exoept remaining time to his a l l i e s . Choiseul having 
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asked i f he should s t i l l name the aooomodation of Spanish 
a f f a i r s as a sine qua non. Grimaldi while yet of that op-
i n i o n , thinks the Spanish ought to wish that blame for the 
f a i l u r e of peaoe be not l a i d to t h e i r disputes and he has 
therefore replied that i t should suffice to repeat to Bussy 
the orders of 10th. Aug. "Not to sign anything without 
the aooomodation of matters with Spain lihaBwise, according 
to the s t i p u l a t i o n of the Treaty between the two courts, 
whioh i s already rat i f l e d and Choiseul has complied. 
Closing^the l e t t e r predicts that f a i l u r e of the negotiations 
would be on Spain's account. 
The foregoing excepts, when corrobarated by similar 
testimony i n P i t t ' s hands, make evident the resolution of 
Spain to block peaoe for Prance u n t i l Spain's acquiescence 
contingent upon the arrangement of her own demands, which 
must be wrung - with French backing - perforce or by fear -
from England. Moreover they indicate the vulnerable point 
of the Spanish policy; concern f o r the Indies f l o t a . Pos-
sessed of the true animus and purpose of the Family Compact, 
having p r o i f undeniable of i t s f u l l consummation, of what 
moment to P i t t would nave been the possession of that i n -
strument with i t s plausibly phrased a r t i c l e s ^ e l a s t i c enough 
for a l l contingencies. Even the other e x p l i c i t conventions 
would have added merely certain d e t a i l s to information a v a i l -
able from other sources. However^had P i t t known these de-
t a i l s - the date Spain intended declaring war and the promise 
j l ) Of. Ante. 
(3) Of. I n s t m c t i o n s B r i s t o l j i e . Boy.jin P a r i . Hist vXV ,'1163. 
(4) Of. Discussion hereafter. 
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of Minorca - he oertainly would have used them i n his argument 
C/L) Even when a synopsis of the Compact^got to England, i t 
seems to have been unknown then that the English and Por-
tuguese a r t i c l e s existed. But a* t h i s time what worl of 
P i t t ' s indicates a perusal either of a copy or an outline 
of the, main compact? While indeed, i t i s unliftely that P i t t 
had the oompaot, i t i s likewise probable that P i t t did not 
especially want l t * i The peace party ministers were anxious, 
insistent i n their desire to see the Treaty* We do not find 
t h i s was P i t t ' s case. He apparently was sure that he knew 
the v i t a l points. He wea convinced that, the peace had f a i l e d , 
that a Spanish war was inevitable. He was aware that despite 
•ft 
her dissimulation Spain was a worse enemy than Franoe. He 
saw the course for England. He fixed upon a counter policy. 
A singleness of a idea reads through the formal paper t f 
advice to the King, and animates h i s arguments to the Cabinet 
urging adhesion to the proposal. This contention i n b r i e f 
was: The h o s t i l i t y i s p l a i n - Strike quick, intercept 
Spain's f l e e t , thwart her schemes, crush the Bourbons! 
• !j An analysis of P i t t ' s arguments w i l l show more c l e a r l y 
and oonolusively the consistency of h i s paper of 18th Sept. 
with his Cabinet utterances i n support thereof. Here, how-
ever, i t i s necessary merely to emphasise what i s already 
se l f evident - that i n t h i s Fuentes-Grimaldi correspondence 
i s to be found quite s u f f i c i e n t basis of P i t t ' s contention. 
(1) Cf. A r t i c l e i n , Quart. Rev. Oot.1899 pp. 348,350, etc. 
(2) Calender Home Office Papers 1761 
(3) Weston Papers i n Hist, M8B,"$ep»*t X p,221. 
(4) Vide «upra. 
(6) Hist vMSB, Report I I I » 
(6) P i t t Cor. .11:69. 
(7) Gra n v i l l e Papers 1:352. 
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In short whatever other infoimation he may, or may not have 
had, from these l e t t e r s - assuming that they were then i n 
P i t t ' s possession - he aould have known r e l i a b l y the essen-
t i a l s o f the Spanish scheme. I t i s pertinent therefore to 
point out the evidence f o r assuming confidently that P i t t 
d i d interoept and d i d u t i l i z e t h i s matted as the foundation 
of h i s proposal. 
There are, of course, a p r i o r i grounds f o r b e l i e v i n g 
that P i t t was intercepting these l e t t e r s - suoh as the pre-
law 
cedent afforded by the usual diplomatic practice of the period: 
the bribery or detention of couriers, the copying of l e t t e r s 
and r e s e a l i n g them with counterfeited seals, the maintenance 
of a corps of spies and secret agents - methods the use o f 
whioh at t h i s time items i n the Ôtate papers, and the evidence 
la) 
of many suoh l e t t e r s go to substantiate. However,there are 
besides c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c reasons, why the B r i t i s h f o r e i g n 
CO 
o f f i c e would have begun intercepting the Spanish correspondence 
and would have maintained the practice during 1761. 
The tone of Anglo-Spanish intercourse f o r the preceding 
two years had been b i t t e r . Relations were becoming constantly 
even more strained, at le a s t from the time of the Spanish 
logwood Memorial of 5th. Sept. 1760, with i t s e s s e n t i a l avowal 
of an ant en te cordiale with France, and of the ^Vaitual communi-
cat i o n of a l l diplomatic exchanges, - which evoked gitts'.,^, 
terse response verbale (21st. Sept.). A l l of t h i s c l e a r l y 
(1) Of. Sent. Mag. Vol, XXXI p. 582, 
(2) B©iijaD;±n Keene* 
(3) Not Necessarily s l i g h t s to Ma, at f i r s t , 
(4) P i t t Cor I I p, 70 Bote, « p.20. 
'( 83) Walpol-e Letters Y o ^ V ^ j ^ . M V*, V. , 
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shows a condition s u f f i o i e n t to commend alertness and oaution 
to an astute statesman. The oontinuanoe of t h i s oaution, an* 
once roused, would hare been insured afresh by the Memorial 
of July 15th, when presented through the extraordinary chan-
n e l of an enemyfs envoy, and accompanied, as i t was with 
t h i n l y v e i l e d threats. 
Aside -from the formal diplomatic exchanges, moreover, 
additional point i s afforded by the unfavorable position 
occupied by the representative of either oo^untyy at the 
oourt of the other. I t i s evident that Lord B r i s t o l did not 
enjoy the confidence or influence accorded his predecessor. 
Instances are given i n hi s reports of open espionage upon 
certain of his interviews with Wall. There are indications 
"also of d i f f i c u l t y i n keeping i n touch with the oourt. 
His despatches bear f o r us uniform indications of the eva-
» 
slons and d u p l i c i t y of Spanish diplomacy - of which, of 
course, he i s not f u l l y aware. In t h i s connection the ev-
idences of the returning influence of the oourt faction 
unfriendly to England should be noted. The Marquis d f Eusenr 
ada was again at oourt. Even Gen. Wall himself hints that 
oourt suspicion of h i s possible overfriendliness to England 
makes the tenure of his position precarious. 
In London Fuentes likewise, could scarcely be called 
persona §rata. ^The comments of Horace Walpole, among 
P i t t Cor l;89,.96, 105 eto 
Of, Ms l e t t e r s i n P i t t Co,r. 
« Gent. Mag. Nov. 1761 pp. 468,469,474. 
Walpole Letters 7;114. 
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others, indicate the disagreeable impression of his manner -
his personal unpopularity. That his relations with the 
CO 
B r i t i s h Foreign Office were unpleasant his constant complaints 
to Wall of P i t t ' s avoidance of him and demeanor toward him -
and of the attitude l a t e r of Bute and Egremont - amply t e s t i f y 
without reoouroo te ether-evidences, offered^ To be sure 
P i t t ' s tactless method as a diplomat was a rude shock to 
the punotilious suavity of the C a s t i l l a n , but the relations 
of Fuentes with the faction i n the council unfriendly to 
Pitt,"and his share i n the tërimaldi project, are doubtless 
excellent clues as to the mental bias and behavioTr both of 
himself and of P i t t . 
Besides the awkward situation of both ambassadors, and 
of f s e t t i n g the chronic Spanish grievances, there were English 
complaints of recent breaches of n e u t r a l i t y by Spain. In 
the main these breaches were maiitime : the unforgotten 
Ante-Gallican a f f a i r - "a bone which the English -fAastiff 
would not grind" - certain oases of sheltering French vessels 
from B r i t i s h seizure, indeed more, aiding or connivimg at 
the f i t t i n g out of f l e e t s of French privateers ySpanish-manned, 
i n Spanish ports; or reversing the si t u a t i o n allowing France, 
with impunity to violate the n e u t r a l i t y of Spanish waters i n 
the oapture of B r i t i s h ships. Moreover,there were other 
reputed violations as the situa t i o n became more tense; as 
the p r a c t i c a l subsidising of France by the loan of money -
coming of Spanish gold on the French border-, and the other 
(1) B.M. add., MSS, 35870 f. 310 
( 2 ) P i t t Cor. I I 119 
(3) BÊakan A wr i t e r i n the Gentlemen's Magaxine Vol 31 
p 582 says: " P i t t had always the conduct of Spain 
i n view, every i n t e l l i g e n c e of secret conferences 
between the- Spanish M i n i s t r y and the French Ambas-
sador Heightened, his .'suspicions etc, 
(4) Mahon IV Appendix , 
(5) P i t t Cor. I I 137, 
(6) P a r i . H i s t . XV p. 1131• 
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indictments uttered by P i t t v2nd Ooty i n his memorable speech 
to the Council. 
I t i s clear that P i t t already had ample motive for 
V 
watching Spanish l e t t e r s , and yet subsidiary evidences tended 
to arouse fresh suspicions and- to confirm old ones - to 
corroborate and make available information gained from the 
intercepted l e t t e r s . 
S i r Jas. Gray minister to the Neapolitan Bourbon court 
w r i t e s ' V i t t at some length under date of 19th May 1761 of a 
speoial v i s i t from Marquis Tenucoi whom he oonsiders the 
most r e l i a b l e member of the Spanish King 1 s household. The 
objeot of the v i s i t ostensibly was tojàrge intercessiom with 
P i t t to secure f a i r e r treatment for Spain, and the c u l t i v a t i o n 
of an Anglo-Spanish understanding to f o r e s t a l l the then im-
minent f u l l alliance - i n i m i c a l towards England - of Spain 
and Franoe. 
The English oonsuls i n southern Spain were sending re-
ports of war preparations i n t h e i r d i s t r i c t s , ôonsul Goldworthy 
wrote 20th Feb. 1761 from near Cadiz of elaborate war pre-
parations rumoured to be intended against Gibraltar. Wall 
i n his 17th Aug. l e t t e r to Fuentes conjectures that P i t t ' s 
source of information as to Spanish moves i s the reports of 
the Consuls. Similar reports of approaching Anglo-Spanish 
h o s t i l i t i e s evidently coming by private commercial chan-
nels were common i n London, to judge from P i t t ' s 28th. July 
despatch to B r i s t o l . 
(1) Beffer^a to i n B.M. add, MSS, 32922 f, 367 
(E) Given i n Hist. Mas, Report I I I p. 135, 
(3) P i t t Cor.11^39 Note, 
( 4 ) P i t t Cor I I ;140^ITote Jand^l41 
(5) On 12 July even, he had t o l d of the prospect of 
Spain's i n t e r f e r r i n g i f the war were continued. 
Gf. Hi st Jïss. Kept. I l l . p ,135 
(60 Newcastle Papiers B.M. add.Hflss ,32928 1 362 
(7) Pari, Hist. XV p 1135 
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Apparently other intercepted l e t t e r s were illuminative, 
as for instance the one i n cipher from Choiseul to d'Avrin-
oourt, i n the summer, t e l l i n g of the plan to protract the 
peace negotiations u n t i l the Spanish f l o t a should have 
arrived. 
Moreover P i t t had valuable confidential reports 
bearing on the Compact, dir e c t l y . Whether we receive or 
deny the Keith or Louis Dutens conjectures, we have proof 
of Stanley's a c t i v i t y i n th i s regard. One l e t t e r 18th Aug. 
(probably A that of 20th Aug) i s mentioned reporting the 
suspicions a c t i v i t y of Grimaldi, and the responsibility for 
the 16th July Memorial. Another note 2nd. Sept, reports 
the signature of the pact and encloses a supposed secret 
a r t i o l e directed against England. A l e t t e r of 8th. Sept. 
t e l l s of the convoy of f i f t e e n vessels sent to meet the 
plate f l e e t . In another l e t t e r he says:"When Spain declares 
war I suspect an attack on Portugal", - Upon which remark 
P i t l a i d stress in the 26th Sept Cabinet session. 
F i n a l l y i n Lord Bri s t o l ' s l e t t e r of 31st Aug. oover-
ing the interviews with Wall since the receipt (16 Hag) 
of P i t t ' s protest to Spain (of July 28), and enclosing 
Wall*s paper to B r i s t o l of 28th Aug. - there i s made by 
Spain o f f i c i a l and complete avowal of Bussy's action and 
v i r t u a l admission of an agreement with France - detrimental 
to England - purporting to be the outcome of a ïrench. 
proposal. This at l a s t , of course, was matter P i t t could 
openly produce against Spain, as he did i n the 18th Sept 
"paper"• 
Via* ante page 4 2 ^ 1 ^ ^ ^ 
Also d£. iremarlcs i n Appendix. 
mm jâjg ŜF"** 
, i f 
Yet as said before, i t should be borne i n mind that 
the Stanley and B r i s t o l l e t t e r s were, we must believe, 
merely subsequent subsidiary evidence. In other words, they 
were rather i n the nature of pointed proofs of the e a r l i e r , 
primary i n t e l l i g e n c e * - t h e intercepted correspondence -
while 
already had by P i t t , whioh wtlx of themselves doubtless 
convincing to him, he might not have wished - uncorroborated -
to lay f u l l y before h i s c a v i l i n g colleagues. I t i s then 
c l e a r thus far, that not only might the Fuentes correspon-
dence have been intercepted, but that - according to r e l i a -
hie evidences - P i t t r e a l l y d i d secure i t , that he corroborat-
es.) 
ed i t , and made use of i t during t h i s time, as w i l l be shown. 
Doubtless the prime testimony i n proof of P i t t ' s 
actual possession of t h i s correspondence - the test of i t s 
authenticity as well - i s afforded by the circumstances 
under which we have i t . (1st) These l e t t e r s are published 
i n the " P i t t Correspondence" and are given there with no 
e d i t o r i a l explanation other than the general t i t l e page 
statement that the documents printed are from the o r i g i n a l 
P i t t papers, except indeed that each of these l e t t e r s i s 
marked: "Endorsed, 'translation from cipher"". (2d) The 
l e t t e r s are those only^. which might be intercepted i n Eng-
land i n passing either to or from Fuentes. l o t a l e t t e r 
between Brimaldi and Wall - which were routed overland 
through Franoe by t r u s t y couriers - i s found. (3d) They 
begin and end at approximately the dates when - according 
( l ) Cf. Weston Papers, Cecil-Papers etc. 
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to the foregoing argument - P i t t would most have desired them, 
and when he oould most readily have obtained them. (4th) They 
are p l a i n l y the very l e t t e r s P i t t would have desired preserved 
to j u s t i f y h i s course. (5th) They must have oome into h i s 
possession o r i g i n a l l y , f o r no one had a better chance to 
obtain them f i r s t hand. Again had he obtained them, for the 
benefit of h i s future reputation, from some other member of 
the Cabinet with s i m i l a r f a c i l i t i e s f o r intercepting - say 
Bute or Newcastle • which under the circumstances of fehis 
r e l a t i o n s with them would be unthinka&le, some indication of 
the faot probably would be found among the papers of the 
o r i g i n a l possessor, i . e . some notice, or perhaps a missing 
l e t t e r . (6$ rThat such l e t t e r s should have got among the 
P i t t J%is. instead of being kept i n the public archives, by the 
anachronism of B r i t i s h practice, tends not to weaken but to 
validate the argument. (7th) No hin t , or assertion can be 
found doubting the genuineness of the l e t t e r s . Instead the 
internal evidence of the l e t t e r s themselves - t h e i r consis-
tency, and the external evidence of various events,.and the 
testimony of other correspondence and o f f i c i a l papers, a l i k e 
indicate that they are genuine. (8thJ Ho hint of the 
l e t t e r s having been purchased at a subsequent date from some 
member of the entourage of Fuentes, no p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r 
having been l e f t behind at his departure, no chance of 
t h e i r having been l o s t , or stolen from the embassy, can 
be entertained. (9th) In f i n e , the date and circumstances 
(1) B.M. add.Ifi^s, 35870 f, 301. 
of the publication of the "Chatham Papers',' the absence of 
any such qualifying statement, the very incompleteness of 
the chain of letters - a l l militate against any supposition 
of the l e t t e r s having been discovered by accident or search 
among private papers or i n public .archives of England or the 
continent and copied by the editors of P i t t ' s papers. 
Yet P i t t did not merely have these Spanish let t e r s 
in his possession; evidence of t h e i r use by him i s specif i c -
a l l y to be found. In P i t t ' s attitude toward Spain and France, 
i n his remarks at times, there are indications of certain 
information whioh could have been gained from these l e t t e r s , 
although possibly to be obtained elsewhere. Without entering 
minutely here into a proof of t h i s point i t may nevertheless 
be well to reoalljoertain prominent evidences thereof. At 
the opening of the peace overtures, when the impression of 
the e a r l i e r l e t t e r s i s s t i l l fresh P i t t seems suspicious of 
Choiseul's sincerity, When the chain i s broken, while i t 
seems that the Grimaldi project has not matured, and when 
P i t t believes that the î ew English Victories - Beli&Isle, 
Kirch Denekern, Pondioherri, Dominica - have impressed 
Choiseul, then he has hopes of a successful peace. After 
23rd July he is again doubtful, and at the close of August 
while Stanley i s s t i l l confident - but when Grimaldi writes 
Fuentes otherwise - P i t t i s convinced of the f a i l u r e of the 
negotiations. Also now, as for instance, i n the Cabinet 
24th of August, he talks of his desire to fight both Franoe 
and Spain, i f the Peace f a i l s . 
(1) P i t t Cor, I I p,126 .Uote 2. 
(2) Ibid,126, 
(3) . Ibid*126-7 Hote , 
(4) . Was P i t t watching D'Ossun? of Gent Mag. Vol, SI',582 , 
(5) Granville.Papers I 368. 
(6à The conduct of Bussy i s almost i n expIAaable except 
upon the supposition that Choiseul's s i n c e r i t y was 
questionable, l i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Newcastle 
f a c t i o n were so patent that there would seem to be 
good cause to suppose that h i s r e a l mission was to 
create/an opposition to P i t t such as would brin& h i s 
f a l l / 
(7) P i t t Corv*96 ;Vol I I 
(8) Home Office Papers 1761, #214, 
( 9 ) P i t t Cor. Vol I I -142. 
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P i t t wa8 v i g i l a n t l y suspicious through the whole season, 
however, i n the ninth a r t i c l e of Stanley's instructions as en-
voy i s the clause "You w i l l give watchful attention to the con-
duct and motions of the Spanish ambassador, and of a l l matters 
whioh may he of consequence and worthy our knowledge", Stanley 
writes i n a private l e t t e r 9th, June that he can comply with t h i s 
though i f i t be done eff e c t i v e l y i t w i l l be at "Vast'expense". 
His subsequent l e t t e r s would indicate that P i t t must have thought 
i t worth the expense. Meanwhile Bussy was being shadowed in Ion-
don and his every move reported to P i t t . Admitting the p o s s i b i l -
i t y of various excellent reasons for this espionage - of Bussy, i n 
pa r t i c u l a r - yet ; not-wl Llmlanding the necessity of following 
up the information given i n the March l e t t e r s , and the need rat xke 
vtrnm kaaft to supply the break i n the chain of intercepted l e t t e r s 
on the one hand, and on the other the desire to check up the most 
"contradictory behaviourof Bussy" with the proceedings and l e t t e r s 
of Grimaldi, may well have been the motive. 
That the correspondents themselves suspected something 
n 
of what P i t t was doing, i s indicated by the statement i n the Puantes 
- Grimaldi l e t t e r 10th Maroh of the need of a more d i f f i c u l t code. 
Probably they thereafter eluded P i t t by usiné the French courier 
wherever possible. P i t t must have suspected t h i s , hence an 
attemp-^fo v e r i f y the suspicion, or to pick up the lost due may 
afford an explanation for the complaint made by Bussy to the 
B r i t i s h Government of the detention of his courier i n the post 
o f f i c e on the man's 
t l ) P a r i . Hist,XV 1125 Botes, 
(2) Granville Papers 1.367, 
(3) B.M. add. M^BB. 35870 f, 310 > 
(4) Ditto 35928 f, 362, 
(5) 35929 f,18. 
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a r r i v a i from France. And thereafter""as peace was thought 
A 
possible tampering with the French courier would scarcely 
have been t r i e d . The 13th Sept. l e t t e r from Grimaldi, as 
i t expressly explains - and possibly 31st Aug. note also*— 
was not sent by Choiseul's messenger. 
The remarks of P i t t and especially those of Temple i n 
debate on the Spanish situation 11th Deo, 1761 have been 
understood to refer to some secret information apparently 
known to but part of the ministers, Jenkfesbn and Newcastle 
both write to t h e i r confidentes at times of P i t t ' s having 
secret information whioh he was reluctant to show his Cabinet 
associates. In Jenkinson's case, of course, i t is possible 
that he was not informed uy Bute of a l l such information. 
S t i l l there may doubtless have been matter known to P i t t 
alone, o^ whioh some of tnese l e t t e r s may have been part. 
On the other nand, however, that a few at least of the 
intercepted Spanish l e t t e r s were l a i d before the entire 
Cabinet i s known. Hardwicke's notes on the End Oot. session 
say that the 13th Sept. l e t t e r was read there and discussed, 
and excerpts given attest the identity of the l e t t e r . This 
dr a f t , moreover, speaks of intercepted l e t t e r s between 
Grimaldi and Fuentes. Also Newcastle writes Uardwicke 
A- ^ s~ 26th Sept of a Srimaldi l e t t e r . The Newoastle minutes f o r 
2nd Oct. mention a l e t t e r being presented - dated 13th Aug.-
There i s no l e t t e r of that date, but a natural inference 
i s that l e may refer to the Important despatch of 31st Aug. 
(1) B.M. add MSS 35870 f 310 
(2) d i t t o 32929 f 18 
(3) P a r i . H i s t XV 1135 
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or lass probably the one of 13th Sept. Likewise i t i s re-
motely possible that there may be an unpublished l e t t e r of 
13th August. A l e t t e r or either 13th or 31st August would 
aooord with Hardwicke's statement, just noted, of more than 
one l e t t e r . 
According to the minutes quoted, f i t t i n his closing 
remarks speaks of "the papers i n my bag" or "matters i n 
my bag" of suoh character as unresented would be an eternal 
s t a i n on England. Newcastle thinks the referenoe i s to 
B r i s t o l ' s l e t t e r and Wall's paper. Hardwioke suspects that 
P i t t had a copy of the Compact. Yet evidently P i t t refers 
to matter unknown to the whole Cabinet. The B r i s t o l l e t t e r , 
on the contrary was well known to a l l ; that he had,and with-
held any B r i s t o l l e t t e r s i s impossible, that he had the 
"Compact" i s quite as improbable. 
That P i t t used these intercepted l e t t e r s both iffor his 
own guidance and to influence the action of the council i s 
evident, that he may have made further use of them i s proba-
ble. Thus the mention of B r i s t o l suggests the query: Whether 
the referenoe i n his interviews with Wall to a long negotiation 
by Spain for an alliance with Franoe, hostile to England, 
and the accompanying hin£ that probably the real intention 1 
of Spain was an early declaration of war - was made upon 
Br i a t o l ' s own authority; or since i t i s usually asserted that 
B r i s t o l followed his Instructions olosely i n t h i s instance, i f 
P i t t may not have suggested these very statements, and i f so, 
as a result of the interoepted l e t t e r s . 
(1) B.M. add. MSSN 32928 f. 248; 
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Judgement upon n i * evidence such as bas been bare 
adduced i s admittedly dangerous, assurance of proof may 
soaroely be bad i n the absence of f u l l and indubitable 
statements - and v e r i l y such are not many. I f then the 
weight of probability necessarily be accepted, the de~ 
duction i n respect to the theory here discussed i s simply 
' f £ f v : i M • £ i 
whether i t may not be granted that, from their subject 
matter, from thé motives for intercepting and keeping them, 
from undeniable or apparent instances of their use - these 
cipher l e t t e r s of Fuentes and Grimaldi furnished the primary 
essential basis of P i t t ' s contention for the commencement 
of a Spahiah war. 
Conceding as provei, the contentions here presented, 
i t remains to review the issue. As has been shown P i t t 
proceeding upon the basis of his confidential information, 
formulated h i s program recognising that peace with neither 
France nor Spain was longer plausible - having thus secured 
the r e c a l l of Stanley and the termination of the French 
negotiations at a meeting 15th Sept., P i t t turned to the 
Spanish phase of his program. With Lord Temple 18th. Sept. 
he drew up a paper advising the Xing to immediate War upon 
Spain. The following day papers showing the gravity of the 
Spanish relatione were l a i d before the Cabinet meeting. 
The other ministers were enough impressed by the situation 
to advise reinforcements to the fle e t s and forces i n the 
WeBt Indies and the Mediterranean but they held that Spain 
should be n o t i f i e d prior to a declaration of war. P i t t 
(1) Grftnville Papers I p,386» 
B.M. add. MSS* 32928 f f , 225-6 « 
Weston Papers i n Hist MSS. Kept. X 222, 
(2) SIM, add MSS. 35870 f\301 v 
(3) " I f Franoe should reject (English Fishery ahxi ultimatum) 
and the war he continued I had rather i t he with France 
and Spain j o i n t l y than with Franoe alone" 
(4) Probably a chief motive was the desire to adopt a common plan of opposition also to secure delay u n t i l such ministers as were known to be for peace or 
against P i t t , but were out of the c i t y could be com-
municated with. However the ministers may not have 
anticipated the .time and exact xa character of P i t t ' s 
proposal, even supposing they f u l l y recognized h i s 
attitude toward Spain. 
(5) B.M. add. Mss. 32928 f. 259, 
(6J di-tto 32928 f, 248. 
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thereupon presented his paper to which he siught t h e i r 
adhesion before giving i t to the King. 
This paper whioh precipitated the ministerial c r i s i s 
was oouohed in formal language, being probably intended 
for eventual publication. I t states that Spain now has 
acknowledged to B r i s t o l f u l l responsibility for the memorial 
of 15th. July presented by Bussy demanding the settlement 
of three Spanish claims (which are then recapitulated) 
an unjust and unexampled proceeding tantamount to a threat 
of war. She thus at la s t has f u l l y avowed the complete 
Union of the Bourbons, a matter so v i t a l that i t devolves 
upon his majesty to take the necessary measures for the 
defense of hie honour and the interests of his people. 
Though P i t t ' s peoposal had been presaged by oertain 
previous remarks, yet his colleagues apparently were quite 
unprepared for the introduction of h i s paper. After a i n 
lengthy session adjournment was taken u n t i l Monday (21st 
Sept) on the plea of needing longer time to consider the 
r 
matter. Meantime the opposition arranged a conference which 
met at Devonshire House that evening, the ! Dukes of Devon-
shire end Newcastle, Lords Mansfield and Bute attending. 
Besides planning t h e i r course in the coming meeting and 
preparing copies of the minutes^tnese sessions casting 
a favorable l i g h t upon the i r attitude, they drew up a ooun-
ter-proposition on the Spanish issue. They declared an 
immediate declaration of war unjust and inprudent i n t h e i r 
view. They would advise the King instead to send a de-
(1) B.M. adfc.MSS,32928 f,259, 
(2) d i t t o 32928 f, 303, 
(3) ( s i x present) 
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spatoh to B r i 8 t o l affirming his friendliness toward Spain-
fhenoe proceeding to reconsider the Spanish complaints 
B r i s t o l should reject the f i r s t two, but propose a modus 
vivendi on the Honduras claim suggesting also an ultimate 
settlement i n l i n e with Spain'i desire. .But i n .return 
England should i n s i s t upon a candid categorical statement 
as to whether Spain intended to enter the war against 
England. Failure to answer this query sa t i s f a c t o r i l y Lord 
B r i s t o l should consider tantamount to a declaration of 
war and should at onoe demand his passports and notify the 
conaula. 
The aotive of thia counter project apparently was 
to provide a method by which the ministers without laying 
themselves l i a b l e to a charge of pusillanimity could l e t 
Spain avoid war and yet "save her face" or at least could 
ttwJJW; of b.gi#ng „ar upo» Spai*. Whether th.ee 
ministers deluded themselvee with the hope of avoiding 
war by t h i s policy i s hard to determine. Newcastle at 
least saw that war would be i t e l o g i c a l result, but he pre-
ferred t h i s method as less offensive than P i t t ' s desire 
that B r i s t o l dapaw* at once without taking leave. 
In the meeting of S l s t . Sept. each faction upheld i t s 
projeot. r.ansfield however shifted temporarily to P i t t ' s 
position, hence neither party had a majority.Because of 
the King's desire to defer action u n t i l Stanley's return 
the f i n a l decision was postponed pending his a r r i v a l . 
P i t t however gave his paper to Bute to be handed to the 
(1) B.M. add.MSS. 32928 f. 325, 
(2) d i t t o 32928 f, 362, 
(3) n 32929 f, 18^ 
" 35870 f. 310, 
(4) Cf. evidence given i n d i s c u s s i o n on previous pages. 
(5) Newcastle & Haf^ricke papers quotedj^citations above, 
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King who Arefused to receive ̂ from himself that morning. 
Meanwhile by informal conferences and at a second caucus 
(23rd Sept) the opposition strengthened their stand. The 
accession of the ministers hitherto absent was gained 
and a series of v i s i t s by them to the King objecting to 
P i t t ' s polioy was carried out. Likewise the résignation 
of P i t t seeming now inevitable " the question of his suc-
cessor was f u l l y discussed. 
The council reconvened 2nd. Oct.. It was a momentous 
session. Except Bedford, seemingly a l l Cabinet lords were 
present. Stanley's return had aided practically not at a l l 
in resolving the doubt to Bourbon plans. P i t t opened the 
discussion, speaking in support of his paper. His argument 
as presented at the three meetings was a f u l l e r exposition 
of the essential points of his formal paper, which could be 
supported now in the secrecy of the council by confidential 
5~ 
evidences. I t involved three points: (1) That the attitude 
of Spain was certainly hostile. {2} That she had a scheme 
to oheokrate England by a Franco-Spanish agreement prompted 
by an inimical motive, purposing either (a) to force a 
compliance with Spanish demands or (b) in l i e u thereof to 
prevent peace, and to enlarge the scope of the war. 
(3) That to meet Spain's designs - now in the f i n a l stage-
England must accept the fact^an already existing state of 
war with both houses of the Bourbons, and must intercept 
Spainfe treasure fleet and attack ner before she could 
s t r i k e B r i t i s h interests and a l l i e s . 
il) B.M. add % s . 32929 f. 18, and 35870 310, 
(2) Annual Register etc. 
(3) P a r i . Hist. ?SL ^ C j ^ , 
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The other ministers spoke in turn, a l l the nine save 
Temple opposing P i t t ' s contention. Their grounds were var-
ious hut scarcely even specious. They harped chiefly upon 
fear of superior Spanish strength, the p o s s i b i l i t y of for-
elgn complications, and the unpreparedness of England. 
Temple i n a second speech angrily retorted and l e f t the 
meeting. P i t t then made his well known speech rehearsing 
the reasons for his being i n the government and recounting 
hie successful conduct of the war in the face of opposition 
and laok of support from his colleagues. He reiterated yet 
more strongly his advice for war with Spain. He reminded 
them of his relations with the people and, announced his 
intention no longer to remain in a position where while 
responsible for neasures he could no longer guide them. 
Lord Granvilï«Pin^oomplimentary speech but insisted that the 
present business had been expressly deferred by the King 
to the action of the whole ministry. Thereafter by action 
of the majority the measure proposed by P i t t was rejected. 
The f i n a l outcome is.fa m i l i a r . The resignation of P i t t 
was tendered and readily acoepted 5th Oct. that of Temple 
9th Oct. Lord Egremont was P i t t ' s successor. By him i n -
structions i n l i n e with the policy of the opposition faction 
were sent to B r i s t o l . He was given a haughty answer by 
Wall and curtly informed that the English note was a 
v i r t u a l declaration of war. The rupture of diplomatic 
(1) Gentleman's Magasine Vol. 3& \ \ 3. 
(2) American H i s t . Review Vol, V;671, 
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intercourse followed d i r e o t l y . B r i s t o l was shown no 
oourtosy i n departing and with some d i f f i c u l t y reached 
Portugal. Fuentes i n taking leave presented a cavalier 
note i n whioh war was v i r t u a l l y denounced against P i t t . 
Spanish forces were mobilised on the Portuguese border before 4 
the olose^lV61 and the opening of the new year brought the 
formal declarations of war. Thus the peace junto had f a i l e d 
to prevent the war, had subjected B r i t i s h representatives 
to gratuitous affronts and had thrown the i n i t i a l advantage 
into the grasp offëpain. That *he event of the struggle was 
advantageous to England was but l i t t l e due to the work of 
the altered ministry. Rejecting as we may the legend that 
P i t t had outlined i n advance the whole plan of the war, 
nevertheless, the incalculable results of his previous 
labors, the effects of his influences, the fear of incur-
r i n g h i s opposition were large factors i n bringing victory 
to England. I f P i t t out of the administration was s t i l l 
the prime faotor for B r i t i s h success, no argument i s needed 
to show what had been the benefits of his continuance as 
d i r e c t i n g minister. Likewise then i t . can be conceded with 
reasonable certainty that the e v i l results shortly following 
h i s resignation would have been obviated. 
Having thus with the recognition of the consequences 
of P i t t s resignation returned to the f i r s t point of this 
paper, i t were well i n conclusion to recapitulate the conten-
tions herein presented. Thus i t has been shown: (1st) That 
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t h e r e s i g n a t i o n of P i t t was due not to a long p o l i t i c a l 
i n t r i g u a - pa r t i s a n or personal- but rather to h i s i n s i s t e n c e 
upon a Spanish p o l i c y to whioh a l l other elements of the 
Government were averse, and about which an opposition 
, . was could ooalesoe. (2nd) That P i t t ' s Spanish p o l i c y consistent 
A, 
with the h i s t o r i c a l status of Anglo-Spanish disputes, and 
w i t h Immediately previous events. (3rd) That M s p o l i c y 
was grounded upon a s u f f i c i e n t l y f u l l and r e l i a b l e knowledge 
of the formation and purpose of the Family Compact. (4) That 
the p r i a t r y basis of P i t t ' s knowledge of the compact was 
a aeries of intercepted o f f i c i a l l e t t e r s to or from the 
Spanish ambassador Fuentes. ( l a s t l y ) That the issue j u s t i f i e d 
the wisdom of P i t t ' s Spanish p o l i c y . 
Leoky 111,36» 
l e c k y 111,35 Bote 
A P P E N D I X . 
ïhe introduction i n this paper of material so ao-
oesBihle and so perspicuous as i s the •-intercepted Spanish 
oorrespondenoe would, seemingly, he unnecessary. Ye t while 
surely the pertinency of the information therein contained 
must hare been apparent, and i n a manner has been recognized, 
- neverthelessj the f u l l significance of the whole correspon-
• # » 
denee i n respect to P i t t ' s knowledge of the Family Compact, 
i f perceived, certainly has not been presented, with the 
proper meaning and emphasis. While this i s uniformly true 
a few instances i n point may be presented here. 
(1) Leoky says i n regard to the source of P i t t ' s information. 
"Mr. Stanley —— obtained one of the a r t i c l e s -— and con-
f i d e n t i a l reports from other quarters corroborated the account". 
He oites as his authorities Walpoles Geo. I l l , Adolphns, and 
the Chatham Correspondence (one l e t t e r ) . In an e a r l i e r con-
nection, however, a footnote oites the Grimaldi-Fuentes l e t t e r s 
as showing the e a r l i e r stages of the negotiation, yet he does 
not show the connection of the beginning with the denouement. . 
He does not perceive that the date of Stanley's "Art. X" 
l e t t e r preoludes the chance of i t s being the f i r s t information. 
Hor indeed does he mention the fact that t h i s "Art X" i s not 
found i n the Bourbon "Pactes". F i n a l l y the s l i g h t notice 
of the oorrespondenoe i s so incidental that i t i s apt to be 
overlooked e n t i r e l y even by anyone looking for Lecky's 
( l ) Anson's Graf t o n page I E , Up t a . 
Cf. a l s o i n t r o d u c t i o n page XXXI x 
5 , ill f • i 
(8) French " I n s t r u c t i o n s t o igmbassadors X I I b i s . 
(3) Eng. H i s t . Rev. Vol. x v i i 
(4) Q u a r t e r l y Review Vols 190 (Oct 1899), 
(5) ,r TT n 190 (Oct 1899)p336x 
(6) " " ' * n ' p339. 
App "2" 
opinion on the question. 
(£) Lord. Anson in editing Grafton's Memoirs has a note re-
f e r r i n g to the l e t t e r s , hut merely as evidence that the 
Family Compact oame from Grimaldi who forced Choiseul*s 
French 
hand. We have seen from the latest o f f i c i a l sources that 
the basis for such assumption i s hut impart true. 
(3) Mr. Winstanley i n h i s a r t i c l e already, mentioned quotes 
certain statements by. Fuentes i n the early l e t t e r s as evidence 
of a-long cabal to get r i d of P i t t ' s dominance, but he. over-
looks entirely.the "Compact" information,-not quite consonant 
with h i s thesis.- And yet the r e l i a b i l i t y of knowledge Fuentes 
mignt have of the plans and motives of B r i t i s h p o l i t i o i a n s i s 
dubious, of t h e i r own schemes h i s l e t t e r s to his colleagues are 
most oompetent testimony. 
(4) The Oct. 1899 Quarterly Beview a r t i c l e has references 
to the "evidence of certain intercepted despatches of the 
Bourbon Agents", whioh notices are vaguely expressed.subor-
dinated i n the discussion, and at length l i g h t l y dismissed 
without argument, so that even with several readings t h e i r 
significance i s scaroely perceivable. So flippant a depre-
c i a t i o n of usual theories of P i t t ' s source of information 
seems unaccountable except that the slightness of the Lutens 
Thesis may have required i t . Because .Newcastle had information 
and copies of the two former "Pactes", why should i t he post-
ulated that of necessity he had a copy of the t h i r d , or that 
"101" sent i t . Why because Dutens mentions that"he warned 
Cf. F ran oh I n s t r u c t i o n s Vol XV, apparently tne sann 
i s t r u e i n the case of most of the French envoys 
of. v o l s . I,X ce XVI. 
Cf. Quarterly Review Oct 1908. 
On P^tte r e s i g n a t i o n c f . Green: Chatham pp 180-182. 
Transactions Eoyal H i s t o r i c a l Society,Beries I I I 
Vol, I I (1908) S 
So f a r as i s known. 
Quarterly Review Oct. 1908. 
P i t t early of Spanish motives i n f e r às a conséquence that he 
sent the "Compaot" ,especially when we know neither the date 
nor oharaoter of the warning sent, and whena moreover France 
gave her own Sardinian envoy scant information or the treaty. 
(6) Mr. Green's " L i f e of Chatham" i s recent and has heen 
recognized as perhaps the most competent. On t h i s point 
h i s narrative follows the time worn statements. F i n a l l y 
however he says: "Thé one h i s t o r i c a l mystery in connection 
with Lord Chatham i s the question how far he knew the terms 
of the seoret treaty (Compact) at the time of his resig-
nation, i f t e r t h i s statement Mr. Green devotes the remainder 
of an appendix to questioning"the t r a d i t i o n that he (Pi t t ) 
had secret information, and imparted that information to the 
Cabinet". Needless to say the author does not c i t e - seems not 
to have read - the Fuentes-Grimaldi l e t t e r s . 
(6à) Indeed the only adequate recognition of the "Fuentes 
Correspondence i s in a b r i e f discussion appended to Miss 
Hotblack's essay on "The Peace of Paris" - received since the 
preparation of t h i s paper. The author however i n regarding 
the information as secondary - "Corroborative" merely -
haa overlooked the fact that the e a r l i e s t certain mention of 
the Compact project, and the f u l l e s t évidence of i t s develop-
ment - accessible to P i t t i s found i n these l e t t e r s . 
(7) The most recent reference - found i n Mr. Robertson's 
f u l l c r i t i c a l review of Chatham bibliography and sources -
possibly from neoessity parries the point at issue here with 
American K i s t . Rev. x 'V^r 
Eng. Hist. Rev. Vol,XXIV pp 1B1-7, 
the statement^that P i t t demanded war with Spain because he 
had oorreotly divined her intentions, but that the evidence 
submitted to the Cabinet was not conclusive. Likewise c r i t i c a l 
n otioes of Corbett 1 sITS^a^c*gy-^ the Seven Years War" and the 
l a t e s t volume of Waddington's La Guerre de Sept. A-os". are not 
elucidative. 
In view of the foregoing i l l u s t r a t i v e instances, another 
presentation of the case with other arrangement, and argument 
has seamed j u s t i f i a b l e . 

